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Tennessee's public mental health system was transfonned from a fee-for-service 
program to a capitation-based managed care program in July 1996. Given the interest in 
alternative health care policies, the outcomes of such a refonn experiment were evaluated 
from the perspectives of cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness. 
Monthly time series data on program expenditures, access, utilization, and quality 
of care were compiled for two distinct program periods: January 1994 to July 1996, the 
traditional fee-for-service period administrated by the Tennessee Department of Mental 
Health and Mental Retardation (TDMHMR); July 1996 to December 1998, the 
capitation-based managed care period administrated by the TennCare Partners Program 
tTPP). Utilization and quality of care functions were constructed for each period in which 
utilization (bed-days, services) and quality of care (recidivism rates) measures were 
assumed to be dependent on levels of program funding, positive demand for care 
(program users), and program payment characteristics (i.e., fee-for-service and 
capitation). The managed care impact was then tested with the hypotheses that the 
parameters of the TDMHMR ( FFS) form of the functions were the same as those given 
by the TPP (capitation) fonn of the functions. With the rejection of the hypotheses, 
funding parameters were assessed to identify the direction and mab'Tiitude of cost-
efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Multi-variable linear ret:,Jfessions, SAS® Auto-
regression procedures, Chow tests, and maximum likelihood estimation were used in 
parameter estimations and outcome evaluation. 
The research demonstrated that the managed care program achieved the goal of 
cost containment, at least in the short run. The comparable spending on inpatient and 
outpatient care for the TPP capitation program ,vas nine percent below the projected 
spending in the TDMHMR fee-for-services program it replaced. The realization of cost 
containment was due primarily to volume and intensity reductions in inpatient and 
outpatient utilization. From the TDMHMR/FFS period to the TPP/capitation period, 
V 
inpatient bed-days were reduced by 21 percent, and average lenb>th of hospital stays was 
down from 19 days per month to 11 days per month. Outpatient services were down 
about seven percent, from five and one-half units of services per user per month to four 
units of services per user per month. The capitation program held average cost 
advantages in member cost (PMPM) and user cost (PUPM), even though the TPP 
program was not able to demonstrate comparative cost-efficiencies when measured in 
traditional output measures (i.e., per diem rate and unit cost of outpatient services) in the 
period observed. It is cautioned that the conclusion could be different if true costs of care 
from the provider level were knmvn. 
Despite the reduction in service utilization, all levels of access to care increased 
under the managed care program: 1,103 percent in program eligible members, 23 percent 
in pro!:,rram users, 39 percent in inpatient users, and 24 percent in outpatient users. More 
importantly, the managed care program demonstrated better quality of care outcomes 
measured by 30-, 60-, and 90-day recidivism rates. Despite the actual increase in 
inpatient admissons, the readmission rates per 1,000 covered lives or per 1,000 patients 
discharged moderated under the managed care program, regardless of the lenb>th of the 
measuring timeframe. Further, the re1:,rressions reviewed an inverse relationship between 
outpatient service utilization and outpatient program expenditures for the capitation 
program, as opposed to a positive relationship for the FFS system. In the short run, such 
an inverse relationship is considered typical within a managed care framework. 
Besides managed care, the TPP's improvement in quality of care ,vas largely 
attributed to reformatting of the service and treatment modalities of the public mental 
health care system. Management and intervention-oriented services and treatment 
programs such as case management, medication management, and crisis intervention 
received increasing emphasis over time, while len1:,>thy treatment programs like day 




On July 1, 1996 Tennessee's public mental health system transitioned from a fee-
for-service (FFS) reimbursement system to a capitation-based managed care system. 
Through carve-out contracting to two Behavioral Healthcare Organizations (BHOs), the 
reformed system, known as the TennCare Partners Program (TPP), offered mental health 
coverage to about one-fourth of Tennesseans, including 800,000 Medicaid eligible and 
400,000 uninsured/uninsurable individuals. With the implementation of the mental health 
care reform program, the state was expecting to further strenh,>then cost containment 
efforts carried out under the TennCare initiative as well as improve mental health care 
access by offering it to more consumers in need. Given the interest and concern in 
alternative health care policies, this empirical research set forward to evaluate the TPP's 
perfonnance from the perspectives of cost-efficiency (quantity of care with respect to 
program expenditures) and cost-effectiveness (quality of care with respect to program 
expenditures) compared to the perfonnance of the traditional FFS system administrated 
by the Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation (TDMHMR). 
Chapter one highlights contemporary issues along with the discussion of health 
care economics in a managed care context. Common cost drivers of public health care 
financing are discussed from the perspectives of demand and supply in the mental health 
care market. Discussed also are necessities to reconfiguring the healthcare landscape 
from a three-player to a four-player platfonn and to adopt managed care as an alternative 
to Tennessee's FFS mental health care system. Further, a series of literature on empirical 
studies dealing with cost containment and quality of mental health care is presented. 
Chapter two discusses definitions of cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness 
measurements. Along with the per diem rate and unit cost as efficiency measures, 
hospital recidivism rates are considered in measuring the effectiveness of a system of 
integrated mental health care. A brief discussion is made about the advantages of using 
recidivism as the indicator of quality. Among all measures, program expenditures, 
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adjusted for inflation in medical care services, are used as the base for cost-related 
analysis. Data collection, modeling, regression, and testing techniques will be discussed. 
Chapter three presents cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness analysis in the areas 
of program access, inpatient care, outpatient care, and quality of care. Actual TPP 
expenditures are compared to projected expenditures as if there were no changes made to 
the system in order to quantify the overall cost containment effort. Average and marginal 
unit costs are estimated based on service utilization trends in hospital bed-days, on 
outpatient service and treatment sessions, on influences of public program funding, on 
number of program users, and on program payment characteristics. Other commonly used 
price indicators, such as SPMPM (per member per month) and $PUPM (per user per 
month), also are evaluated. Further observations are made regarding strategic factors of 
managed care, such as service substitution, contracting, and service system 
reconfiguration. 
Chapter four outlines findings obtained in the research. Policy relevance and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter highlights contemporary issues and discussions of health care economics in a managed 
care context. Common cost drivers of public health care financing are discussed from the perspectives of 
demand and supply in the mental health care market. Discussed also are the necessities to reconfigure the 
healthcare landscape and to adopt managed care as an alternative to Tennessee's fee-for-service (FFS) 
mental health care system. Further, the chapter introduces structural development, service domain, funding 
history, and payment characteristics for Tennessee's public mental health system. Lastly, a series of literature 
on empirical studies dealing with cost containment and quality of mental health care is presented. 
1.1 Public Mental Health Care Reform--The Implication of Economics 
Managed care reforms have pervaded the public mental health care and substance abuse treatment 1 
arena rapidly through the 1990s By the end of the decade, over 90 percent of the states had engaged in 
about I 00 reform programs or activities, from aggressive and extensive risk-based carve-out contracting to 
small-scale capitation experiments geared to traditional safe-net providers. As of July 1999, Tennessee. 
along \Vith eight other states 2, no longer oflers mental health and substance abuse treatment and services 
under the traditional fee-for-service system In fact, Tennessee is one of two states' that offer mental health 
and substance abuse treatment and services under capitation-based carve-out contracts 4 with Behavioral 
Health Organizations (BHOs). only to a much larger population (Steven, 1999 [I]; SAMHSA, 2000 [2]). 
The necessity of aggressively engaging public mental health care in managed care reform is 
compelled by the nation's urgent need in curbing the fast growth in public health/mental health care 
expenditures, and by, if not as urgent, the need to further expand access to mental health care to more 
people who are in great need for care. Several key factors from both the demand and supply sides, and from 
1 Subsequently. the phrase mental health care will be us~-J to denote mental health care and substance abuse treatment (Ml I/SA). 
i According to the Lewin (irnup's report, as of.July 1999 the fi.,llowing. eight states arc offering. the lull range of mental health and 
substance abuse scn·iccs through l lM< ls or BIi( )s (except Washington) under captitation arrangements: Nebraska. Tt:nnc·ssec, 
Washington, Oregon. Rhode Island. v.,mmnt. Virginia. and Wisconsin (SAMHSA.200012]). 
'Nebraska and Tennt:sst:c 
·1 Can:c-uut: A capitation ~·}slcn1 alh)\ving. for certain scrYiccs nonnally consiJcrcJ co\'crcJ lo be carYcJ out of the capitation payn1cnt 
i:,pcn<l,tun:s 01· ,,pcrating cmYc-out progrnms will he dt:duccd from th<: original capitation program. In Tcnnt:ssce. the TennCmc 
Partners Program (mental hClllth and substance abuse car.:) is a caffC"<>lll or the TcnnCarc program (phYsical hcalth car.:). 
consumers to providers to government, are contributing to the financing crisis in the public mental health 
field. 
On the demand side, our health care system still faces the reality of growing unmet health care 
demand, indicated by the increasing size of the uninsured and uninsurable population, and by the shonage of 
providing sufficient and effective services to the population in care. As Mechanic and Aiken summarized: 
"Public mental health services are seriously deficient. Care is typically under financed and fragmented and 
often inaccessible, and many seriously mentally ill persons suffer from considerable neglect (Mechanic and 
Aiken, I 989 [3]. p. I).'' In Tennessee, the TennCare Panners Program (TPP) served about 106,000 
consumers during FY l 996-9i. According to national estimates, Tennessee has about 197,000 residents 
who suffers serious mental illness (SMI) solely among persons age 18 and older during a typical 12-month 
period (Kessler et al, 1998 [4], p. 104). Knowing that the majority of serious mentally ill are mainly cared for 
by the public sector, these statistics indicate that there is still a large number of people with great needs in 
mental health care in Tennessee who are not being properly cared for. 
The pressures from the supply side are 
related mainly to funding adequacy, policy design on 
10 0% 
funding distribution, and payment methodology. ln e.0% 
the past 10 years, Tennessee's public mental health 
care spending has been growing at an average annual 
rate of nine percent, a rate that is above the national 
average for public health and mental health care 
expenses (Mckusick, et al. 1996 [5], p. 155), 
depicted in Fi&>ure I. The potential for continuous 
growth at such a rate is challenged by the overall 
















Figure I: Annual Increases of Health Care Spending 
1986-1996 (current dollan) 
From this point forward, all statistics de,dop<.-<l by this researcher will not Ix: footn,>tcd. 
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shortage in the federal budget and the state financial crisis that led to restructuring Tennessee's Medicaid 
program. The Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation (TDMHMR}, funded mainly 
by Medicaid dollars, has to do its share in curbing public mental health care spending as well. 
Several factors exist as the major forces in driving up expenditures on public mental health care. 
I. Transferred or Adversely Selected Demand Historically, state governments played the significant 
role in caring for chronically mentally ill (CMI) who have been neglected by society and by private health 
care markets (Stein, 1989 [6]; Grob, 1990 [17); Essock and Goldman, 1995 [15)). From market or insurer's 
perspectives, the unwillingness to treat mental illness is due largely to unforeseeable financial risks of a long-
term commitment and uncertainties in the outcome of short-term treatments. Therefore, in general, private 
health insurance plans offer very limited mental health benefits (Newhouse, 1995 [7]; Sturm, 1997 [8]). 
Economically, the parsimony in offering mental health benefits is largely related to the fear of 
adverse selection. Mental health care has a relatively sensitive price elasticity of demand6 (Frank and 
~&Guire, I 998 [9); Dorwart and Epstein, 1995 [IO]; Feldstein, 1999 [ 11]) This characteristic would 
discourage insurers from offering generous mental health benefit packages since it would lead to a certain 
degree of adverse selection of consumers with costly needs in mental health services. Plans would experience 
competitive disadvantages where such selection was significant enough that the marginal cost of insuring 
these consumers would outweigh the marginal revenue of providing care. Therefore, private insurers, if they 
do not have mental health carve-out arrangements, usually offer limited annual mental health benefits7 (Dial, 
et al. 1996 [ 12); Strum, I 997 [8]). To many individuals who have serious and chronic mental illnesses, these 
benefits could be quickly exhausted. For example, the average cost of providing a basic level of services, 
including care management, day activity, medication maintenance services, and residential assistance to a 
patient with moderate mental illness, were estimated at about $4,500 per year; and it would be about 
$12,000 to $20,000 a year for a patient who needs intensive mental health care, such as long-term 
"Frank and McGuire: The demand for mental health is more responsiYc tu signals of price reduction than the demand for general healch. 
\Vhen the amount ,,r const1111crs· pav is reduced, the ,1uantity demanded in mental health goes up hy more thun for gcm:ral health care. 
'Ibis demand response is reforn.-d to as 'moral ha7.ard· in the health insurance literature. 
- ·11u: mc,m annual dollar limits for outpatic11t mmt;.1] health cowragc in 1993 is about $1.54~. ·111c maximum number of co\'Crcd 
outpatient ,·isits per year in 199.1 is 20 ,isits. ·111c inpalimt <la, limit is roughly 33 days on a,cragc (Dial, ct al. 19% 1121, p. 55). 
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hospitalization (Mauch, 1989 [ 13], p. 56). In Tennessee, the average service and treatment cost of 
outpatient and inpatient care was estimated as about $9,100 to $14,000 8 per consumer per year under the 
traditional fee-for-service (FFS) system. Therefore, for persons with chronic and severe mental health 
illnesses who could not be cared for with limited private insurance coverage, and for those who could not 
afford long-term, high-cost mental health treatments, they would be forced out of the private health care 
market (Strum, I 997 (8]). Consequently, this 'forced-out' demand is either 'dumped' out of the private 
market as uninsured or uninsurable, or is transferred or adversely selected into the public mental health care 
system. As Mark Schlesinger describes, when Healthcare Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) emphasize 
very short-term treatments, that is likely to lead to greater "dumping" of the seriously mentally ill into the 
public sector ( Schlesinger, 1989 [ 14]) 
2. lnadeguate and Indirect Financial Incentives and Moral Hazard As for the fundamentals of the 
market economy, self-paying consumers under a fee-for-service system would mc1ke their decisions on how 
much mental health care to purchase based on service prices offered by a market. A hypothetical market 
equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2 by the series D 1, SI, p 1, and q I. When there is private health insurance 
available to consumers, holding constant other system factors such as income, availability and choice of 
providers, health and healthcare know-how. quality of service, population and population risk 
characteristics, the price elasticity of demand is generally expected to be more inelastic then the one given by 
the consumers if they have to pay entirely by themselves9 (Mihalik and Scherer, 1998 [ I 6]; Dorwart and 
Epstein, I 995 [IO]; Frank and McGuire, 1998 (9]). This situation is illustrated in the same figure 
with the series D2, S2. p2, and q2. In an extreme, if the consumers receive public health care 
The Congressional Research Sen·icc used limits of 30 inpatient days and 20 outpatient sessions in its simulations for the costs of parity 
(Strum, 1997 [81. p. 1535). 
'This is calculated based on mwagc utili1111H1n a d a\'eragc unit cost ofseniccs during the TDt-.11-!MR period, assuming I to 2 hospital 
stays per ye.tr r11:r patient . 
$9.136 (in current dollars)= I l'J (hed-<lays) • $262 (per diem rate)!• I (one hospital stay a year)+ l 5.5 (sen·ices) • $63 (unit 
wst)j • 12 (months). 
$14,114 (in currl11t dollars)= [ l'J (bed-<lays) • $262 (perdil·m ratc)j • 2 (two hospital stays a year)+ I 5.5 (senices) • $(,., (w1it 
cost)]• 12 (months). 
·• Mihalik and Scherer (p. 3 ): ··lJtili;,.itton ofbcha,·i,,ral health resources by indi,iduals is also elastic-with utili;,.ation increasing\\ hen 
scr\'iccs urc paid for from pooled resourcx.·s. Similar relationships bct\\el-n use of ser\'iccs and pa)lnent responsibility arc not noted for 
most 111cd1cal eare ... 
D,1nrnn and Epstein (p. 32): ·· ... the demand for 111~11tal health ,·isils is responsive to p,ice clas1ici1y: the lui?hcr the p1ice to the 
~onsun1cr, the )o\\er the utilization. Price resptlnsi,encss decreases as tm:ornc llfpaticnts increases anJ is rnorc scnsitiYL' for mental 










O~--·Dcmand \\hcn public subsidization 
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Figure 2: Financial lncenth·es and Demand/Supply Curves 
assistance or insurance subsidization and do not bear any financial risks in using health care services, 
the price elasticity of demand is expected to become more inelastic then the ones given in the self-pay 
and private insurance scenarios. In general, it 1s recognized that under the public program, the greater 
the amount of public subsidization or assistance to the consumers, the less the elasticity of demand of the 
consumers. Again, ceteris paribus, this case is illustrated in Figure 2 with the series D3, S3, p3, 
and q3. 
The above analysis depicts the empirical concern of over consumption or moral hazard effects 
(Frank and McGuire, 1998 [9]; Newhouse, 1995 [7], Sorkin, 1992 [18]) when consumer choices are 
assisted with pooled resources or other subsidization resources. With the availability of pooled 
resources and subsidization, consumers may bear indirect or inadequate financial risks in health care 
consumption and tend to consume more public mental health services than those who do not have 
5 
public assistance. Using Tennessee as an example, Medicaid SPMI/SED 10 consumers incurred about 
43 units of services per year, while the non-Medicaid SPMI/SED consumers, who canied financial risks, 
used about 28 units of services per year (TDMHMR, 1989 [22], p. l.2.15). 
In a nutshell, the fundamental problem of potential over consumption of health care services in the 
last two scenarios is the separation of the unity of payors and beneficiaries at the time of seeking services so 
that the beneficiaries do not bear direct or sufficient financial incentive when using services. In public mental 
health care systems, once a consumer is accepted into or entitled to use a public mental health care system, 
he bears little or no personal financial obligations. The dilemma is obvious: low co-payments and public 
assistance may be necessary to help people in great service need, but those granted assistance also tend to 
produce, if not to encourage. careless usage of services from the demand side. A patient in the public mental 
health care system may do little weighing in making a decision whether he needs to use the emergency room 
or just take some medication to cope with an acute episode. 
3. Open-ended Public Subsidization with a FFS Arrangement The factors discussed above have the 
effect of driving up public mental health care expenditures by shifting up the demand curve. In like manner, 
open-ended public mental health care subsidization directly contributes to spending escalation through 
affecting the supply curve for public mental health care. 
Historically, providing mental health care to the severally mentally ill was the responsibility of state 
governments. For this reason, the primary purpose for federal subsidization of public mental health care was 
to fund and stimulate public mental health care supply. For many years, states aggressively pursued a policy 
of •'outreaching" to needy consumers who have not been or not been adequately served before. Also, the 
public mental health care network and services have been expanded to include significant portions of 
'" SPMI: ScH:rcly anJ l'crsistcnth Mcnwlly Ill 
SED Serious!, Emotional]~ DisturhcJ 
SPMI and SED statuses arc based on a paticnt"s CRG (Clinical Relt1tcd Groups-used for adulL~) and TI'G (Target Population 
Urnups-usc<l for children unJ youth) assessments. CRG I. CRG2, and CRG3 arc considered as SPML ·n,G2 is c,msiderc<l as SED. 
CRG I - PL'l'Sons age 18 or o,·cr \I ith sc\'Crc and p,.'Tsistcnt mL'lllal illness 
CRG2 - Pt..'!'sons age I 8 or o\'er with scn'!'c mental illness 
CRG 3 - Persons age 18 or ll\'Cr who arc formerly sc\'Crcly impain.'11 
CR(i4 - Persons ugc 18 or O\'Cr \\ith mild/mo<lt."rotc mental disorders 
lT'G I -Chilurt..'11 in state custoJy 
TP( i2 -Children with serous emotional disturhance 
Tl'Ci3 ---Z'hil<lrcn at risk of SED 
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community support related services, such as housing support, employment support, supported living, and 
social skill development" (TDMHMR, I 993 [24)). Consequently, these activities have induced significant 
policy pulled supply or demand of public mental health care. In fact, according to the World Health 
Organization (WHO) "More is better"" (WHO, 1994 [23), p. 4) was a common view held in public health 
policy, which directly promoted supply and demand of health services for decades. 
By design, federal funding was available to states by way of matching. The Matching Fee-For-
Sen,ice Reimbursement clause states that for every dollar the states spend on treating mental health illness in 
the Medicaid population, the federal government will match up to 70 cents of service costs. Many states, 
therefore, have put a great deal of effort in consolidating local resources and increasing the quantity of 
supply so that more funding can be drawn dO\vn from the federal government. 12 To date, this reimbursement 
policy has created an open-ended subsidization pool and has backfired today with the uncontrollable growth 
of Medicaid funding in public health and public mental health care. 
For the past twenty years, open-ended subsidization did stimulate the supply and demand for public 
mental health care. It put federal, state, and local governments in a prominent role in financing the nation's 
mental health and substance abuse services and treatments. By 1996 more than half the funding for mental 
health and substance abuse treatments in the United States came from public sector payors, with Medicaid 
and other state and local government funding accounting for nearly 20 percent each. Medicare made up 13.4 
percent of total mental health and substance abuse expenditures; other federal government programs made 
up 3.8 percent (U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 1996 [26)). 
A fee-for-service payment arrangement also contributes to over consumption. It has long been 
recognized in economic analysis that "any (FFS) reimbursement system that ties compensation for goods and 
services supplied by firms directly to the cost incurred by each individual supplier is likely to provide poor 
incentives for suppliers to produce efficiently (Joskow, 1983 [27), p. 168)." Also, as the World Health 
TP(i4 -Children \\ho Jo not meet the criteria ofTPG2 or TPGJ 
11 The eommunit\' sen ice s\'slcm that was once foeusL-<l primarily on treatmL'fll mm include case management. cmplmmcnt. holL~ing. 
ps\·chosoeial rchabiliwtion, so,;ial support scr\'iccs. fomil~ education and support. and peer sup1x>t sen·ices. 
" For example. the method used in financing new (ll)MI IMR, FY 1 'JK<J-90) ITIL"lllal health scn·ices has successfulh kwragcd nc\\ state 
n:sourccs to ·Jraw down· ne,, tcdcrnl resources. A total of $1.2 million in new state resources will sen·e as the match ti.,r $3.J mill inn in 
lcdcral dollars in the cusc management and supported cmpltwmcnt programs. 
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Organization (WHO) explains: "When providers provide more services to the same population who are 
already in care rather than to new patients, they are likely to produce system waste when volume of the 
services is the only target. Inappropriate incentives may encourage private providers to overservice patients. 
Providers may order unnecessary procedures or they may resort to polypham1acy if their incomes are tied to 
the volume of services provided or to the drug sales (WHO, 1994 [25], p. 12)." 
4. High Technology and High Cost Association Many facts seem to suggest that, at least in the 
short run, medical diagnostics, therapeutic procedures, and pham1aceutical technological advancements may 
have created new goods and services in healthcare that are too costlyn (Aaron and Schwartz, 1993 [28]). 
For example, the introduction of new medications has dramatically offset cost savings brought on by 
managed care efforts. New drugs introduced since 1992 added 40.8 percent to prescription costs and 25.4 
percent to prescription usage in 1999 (Cliggott Communications, Inc., 2000 [29]). Economically, when 
these high-tech and high-cost medical or pharmaceutical advancements are made available in the market, 
trade-off choices often need to be made between using all possible resources to save a few with the new 
drugs and procedures. or to help the many with affordable care. Otherwise, the net effect of technological 
advancement is to shift the supply curve to the left, i.e., raising prices. 
All factors discussed above, transferred or adversely selected demand, inadequate and indirect 
financial incentives and moral hazard, open-ended public subsidization with FFS arrangements, and high 
technology and high cost association, had significant influences on public mental health financing. Today, 
federal and state governments began to play a significant role and, ultimately, experience increasing pressure 
in financing the nation's health and mental health care. Consequently, refom1 in public health and mental 
health care policies becomes inevitable. 
Capitation-based managed care reforms are the most widely adopted policy instruments in the 
public health/behavioral health care industry. Two innovative activities are recognized as strategic to such 
reform. It is essential to "uncouple" payors and providers and "introduce" a class of new players in the 
"Aaron and Sch\\-arl7 (p. 20(,): ·The pace of medical technology· adrnncl· sho\\ s no signs of a hating and mam· signs of accdcrnting. 
·111csc udvanccs almost al\\"u\s add lo costs hy prn,·idin11 new treatments or ne\\ '"1ys to de,dop mcdicully useful information. 
T,·pically. innorntion creates procedures that arc more costly tJmn arc tJ1c methods tJ1c,· replace. Inn,l\·ations may cn:ntllllll\" cllfb 
g.r<l\\th ofhcahh care costs, but curremh· ·cost-reducing medical advance· is alm,ist mi oxym,,ron.·· 
8 
traditional health care diagram (Figure 3). "The natural solution to the potential distortions of cost-based 
pricing or reimbursement in this context is to try to uncouple prices from the cost incurred by a particular 
supplier (Joskow, 1983 [27], p. 168)." In current practice, a uncoupling action is carried out primarily by 
delegating pre-defined and prepaid health services to a third parties, perhaps HealthCare Maintenance 
Organizations (HMOs) or Behavioral HealthCare Organizations (BHOs}, who acting as agents or vendors 
integrating and bridging interests between payors, stakeholders, consumers and providers. Through the 
'uncoupling' process, direct payors will be able to change their role in market exchange from direct paying 
or purchasing services to purchasing insurance (Frank, McGuire and Newhouse, 1995 [30], p. 54) 14 . 
Just adding the delegates in a health care system may not be enough to control a health care 
financing crisis. Joskow further explained that the "uncoupling" process functions to establish prices (and 
simultaneously define the quality and amenity level of care) that do not depend directly on an individual 
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Figure J: The Change of Health Care Diagram 
11 'lli.csc authors also presented the ohscr-n1tion tho.11 managed c~1rc contrnds introduce n fi1ur1h player into the rcl;1tlonship among: the 
lrrnlitional three parties in health .:urc: the pa,w Jde11-a1cs to the ,·enJnr rcsponsihilit,· for mana11-ing and otien p:l\·ing for menial health 
care. 
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supplier's costs. "Profit-maximization suppliers will take prices as given and will have incentive to produce 
efficiently (Joskow, 1983 [27), p. 168)." These established prices, taking the form of capitation payments or 
global budgeting, have now become the backbone or principle strategy of managed care reform. 
Capitation can be considered as a higher level variation of the conventional price control 
application. Compared to the traditional technique of price control, capitation payments are usually not 
directly tied to an individual product but rather to a bundle of goods and services of a pre-defined category 
of care or population. The volume purchase of services at negotiated rates is straightforward price reduction 
and a keystone of carve-out contracts' use of economies of scale (Scheffier, 1998 [31 ]). In practice, the 
DRG (Diagnosis-Related Grouping) prospective payment system is a typical example of categorical 
capitation. Under such a payment system, each specific DRG-related admission is capped; a hospital will be 
paid by the number of DRG-related admissions and not by days or procedures incurred during each 
admission (Sorkin, 1992 [ 18]: Feldstein, 1999 [ 11 ]). A population-based, sometimes referred to as volume-
based, capitation approach is popular in recent managed care development, widely used between payors and 
HMOs or BHOs, and between healthcare maintenance organizations and providers. 
Perhaps the greatest strength of capitation payment policy is its ability to control costs effectively 
while still promoting market efficiency internally. As elaborated above, under a capitation arrangement, 
affected vendors who are facing targeted revenues will still be able to apply market production principles to 
some extent, such as profit maximization, 
factor or price substitution, and supply and 
demand intervention. 
Figure 4 displays a simple picture 
of a capitation-predominated health care 
market. Vendors of the market face a 
shadow price ceiling, c:, imposed as a 
capitation payment. Hence a finite amount 







Fil(ure -4: Illustration of II C11pit11tcd Market 
They also face a perceived, inelastic demand curve of a given population of a public mental health care 
system, DI. To comply with these capitation-based system constraints, vendors will have to manage care, 
both the demand for care and the supply for care, in order to create profit margins. 
Two main strategies are often used in managing the demand for care. One strategy is utilization 
management to reduce the excessive services induced under the FFS system. As mentioned earlier, the 
demand curve of a traditionally substituted FFS market is usually very inelastic, and the level of utilization is 
inflated from both supply-push and public policy-pull. Therefore, unnecessary and inefficient services 
become the initial target in managing consumer demand. Another strategy is care management. Consumers, 
especially high-risk patients, are encouraged to have routine maintenance or preventative visits in order to 
avoid costly catastrophic events. Through heavy involvement in the decision process of each individual 
consumer's day-to-day service needs, the capitated providers tend to pull the market demand curve back to 
the Jett from DJ to D2 (Figure 4) In doing so, they form a demand side profit margin in the capitation 
market. 
Key strategies in managing the supply of care include service, product, and factor substitution, as 
well as selective contracting and networking. For example, optimally arranging substitutions among 
categories of services and procedures, among production sectors ( outpatient, community care, inpatient, 
home health, pham1acy), among labor divisions in healthcare (psychologist versus psychiatrists, doctors 
versus practitioners and nurses), or among selectively contracted or capitated providers, can reduce factor 
prices. In so doing, the capitated vendors can improve service and management efficiencies so that the real 
unit cost of care, p, can deviate from the shadow price ceiling, c, and form a supply-side profit margin (the 
area within abpc) under capitation (Figure 4). 
Capitation as a preferred policy instrument in healthcare and mental healthcare reform may offer 
more practical and political accountability than other alternatives in fulfilling the immediate needs of cost 
containment in public health financing. Among economists, some question whether health care costs must be 
contained and whether either competition or global budgets are 'magic bullets' for doing so (Newhouse, 
1995 [7]). In the lecture on "Economists, Policy Entrepreneurs, and Health Care Reform," professor 
1 I 
Newhouse argued that if health care cost had to be contained 15, when a trade-off exists between risk 
aversion and moral hazard, cost sharing would be the best policy resolution. Since the poor cannot afford 
much cost sharing in government subsidized health care programs, managed care becomes the second best 
solution to the risk aversion and moral hazard trade-off. Further, Professor Newhouse points out that the 
open-ended subsidy for health care insurance increases and distorts the demand 16 for health insurance and 
should be capped. 
Further discussions about the approaches to health care reform was centered on Professor Alain 
Enthoven' s concept of managed competition Enthoven' s notion of managed competition is built upon the 
concept of using a Health Insurance Purchasing Cooperative (HlPC}. The HIPC, as a sponsor "(an 
employer. a government entity. or purchasing coorperative) acting as an agent on behalf of a large group of 
subscribers, structures and adjusts the market to overcome attempts by insurers to avoid price competition 
(Enthoven, I 993 [32]).·· The sponsor will manage the competition by establishing rules of equity, selecting 
participating plans. managing enrollment processes, creating price-elastic demand, and managing risk 
selection. As in managed care or capitation contracting, Enthoven placed emphasis on using joint bargaining 
power in price negotiation (Enthoven, 1993 [33]). 
Other scholars seem to be more conservative in endorsing the managed competition approach 
Jonathan Fielding and Thomas Rice indicate that according to the theory of the second best, Enthoven' s 
managed competition may not solve the problem of health care market failure (Fielding and Rice. 1993 
[34]) They state that increased competition would likely result in undesirable policy outcomes, such as, an 
increase in the number of insurance carriers or health plans (as a result of managed competition) could result 
in higher health care costs and in reduced access to care. 17 More competition could induce insurers to try to 
outdo each other by offering more and more different kinds of benefits, and consumers may pay more in 
1~ J.P. Newhouse and others ha\'e questioned \\hethcr the growth rnte of health care costs is truly too high. 
16 "The grcah.-r the protection ofp<.-,,plc from the random expcn.~es of sickness, the greater the potential o\'erconsumption ofmedieal care. 
at least in the traditiorml lce-for-senice system." (Newhouse, 1995 [71) 
,- ·111c·y argue that as the numhcr of health plans increases beyond some thrcsh,,l<l cueh has less market power n\'cr indi,idual prn,idcrs. 
Be-cause of this. plans will he at a disad,·untage in hargaining with pnniders. and the price the\' receiw ma\' not he as 1,m as 1t \\<llild 
otherwise be. 
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premiums than they otherwise would. Furthermore, competition may result in more costly technology and 
more costly amenities. 
Managed competition may not be ideal in public health care for several reasons. First, it may 
weaken and dissolve the traditional public healthcare networks by exposing them to vigorous market 
competition. For this reason, many states transformed their safe-net provider networks into grass-roots, 
prepaid mental health plans, and then contract with these plans for services. In practice, if only public b,rass-
roots providers are eligible for contracts, there will be no bidding process 18. Some early-stage state reforms, 
such as in Utah and Oregon, are examples of these experiments. Second, managed competition may not 
guarantee a ·cost containment' outcome if price elasticity of demand is too high. Third, insurers may not 
engage sufficient price and non-price competition 19 (JoskO\v, 1983 [27]) in order to avoid adverse selection 
1.2 Public Mental Health Care in Tennessee-The Need for Reform 
Tennessee's public mental health care system was created in 1953 and has since then evolved from 
an institutional care system into a comprehensive mental health service system offering institutional and 
inpatient care, outpatient services and treatments, and various community supports. By the end of the 1980s, 
the state administrative agency, the Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation 
(TDMHMR), began to operate a network of five regional mental health institutes and thirty plus community 
mental health centers (TDMHMR, 1989 [22]). 
In inpatient care, five Regional Mental Health Institutes (R..i\1Hls)2° were fully accredited 
psychiatric hospitals with a capacity of about 2,300 beds. Typically, approximately 8,000 Tennesseans were 
admitted to the RMHis during a 12-month period. On the outpatient side, 37 not-for-profit Community 
Mental Health Centers and Agencies (CMHAs) were in the TDMHMR network serving approximately 
62,500 consumers during a typical 12-month period. About 48 percent of the consumers in the system were 
assessed as SPMI (adults) and SEO (children). The network provided four broad categories of services, 
"< ln~e ~rnnted a \\ai\'er. a state announces a Rcqucsl for Proposals. perhaps usmg. compc1iti1 c bidding. If onlv public pw1·idl'fs arc 
clig.ihlc lill contracts. there is no bidding process. 
'' <,.>u.,lity and amenity-related compclition arc examples of non-price competition. 
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including Integrating Services: assessment, case management, transportation, evaluation; Basic Supports: 
housing and employment; Treatment Services: psychiatric assessment and medication, psychotherapeutic 
services, crisis and emergency services, substance abuse services; and Rehabilitation Services: supported 
living, social skill development (TDMHMR, 1989 [22]). 
The program funding (current dollars) of Tennessee's public mental health care increased from 
about $6 7 million21 in the mid 1970s to $125 million22 in the mid 1980s, then, to $252 million23 in the mid 
I 990s. From fiscal year I 987-88 to fiscal year 1995-96, the average rate of increase in expenditure was 
approximately IO percent. Depending on the funding sources, the TDMHMR operated under three types of 
payment mechanisms: fee-for-service, semi-capitation/grand-in-aid, and self- or private 
payment24(McFarland, 1994 [35)). 
Figure 5 below depicts the fact that service utilization25, funded by government and reimbursed 
through a FFS arrangement grew much more quickly than other programs funded by other payment 
alternatives. The top line in Figure 5 trending upward represents the FFS type of claims that include all 
services delivered to Medicaid and Medicare eligible clients which were not first billed to other payor 
sources. The FFS claims also include services paid for with state or possibly federal funds. Payments to these 
public funded claims were made after sel"\ices were rendered, with the demand for services not limited at any 
time. The bottom line in Figure 5 represents the volume of semi-capitation/grant-in-aid claims that were pre-
funded by various state or federal dollars. These ser,ices were generally earned by allowable expenses. The 
middle line incurred by self-pay claims trending downward represents services paid by either users only, by 
non-public insurance only, or both. In general, no government funding or government insurance was 
involved in this type of claim. 
io Tiu: fin: RMH!s arc the I .akeshore Mental I lealth Institute, the Middle Tennessee M1-"lltal Health Institute, the Moccasin Bend Mental 
Health Institute, the Memphis Mental Health Institute, the Western M1--ntal Health Institute. 
i, Source: ·1uMHMR 1975-7(, Annual Report, p. 20 
ii Source: TDMHMR FY 1980-86 Retrospective. p. IO 
i~ Source: TDMI !MR FY 1995-96 Annual Plan. I'. 73 
24 McFarland lP- 222): "Under the grant-in.aid approach, the state mental health agency transfers funds to local progmms, such as the 
federal go,·emment did under the Community Mental Health Centers Act of 1963. Reflecting. the 1963 connnunity menu.I health center 
philosophy, the grunt-in-aid 1m.-chanism assumes that the prmider will take responsibility for delivery of mental health sen ices needed 
hy residents of a geographically dclincd catchment area.·· 
··scrYices may also be prn,·idcJ on a fee-for sen ices basis particularly for the clients of Mc<licaid programs. M,·dicaid prm·iJ,-rs may, in 
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The TDMHMR administrators became increasingly conscious of efficiency and cost issues with the 
system's performance in the late 1980s. For example, they realized that almost one person in four who was 
discharged from a RMHI would be readmitted within one year. There was a wide range in the amount of 
services available per 100,000 population when regions were compared, indicating inconsistency in services 
and costs in efficiencies across regions. Also, the distribution of expenditures was largely concentrated in 
that almost two-thirds of funding appropriated by the state was allocated to the most restrictive and 
expensive level of care, the RMHI system. and almost half of those resources were used by about only one 
percent of total consumers in the system (TDMHMR, 1989 (22)). 
In order to overcome these system inefficiencies, the TDMHMR system underwent a series of 
significant policy and strategic changes to improve perfonnance and efficiency. Most of these reforms 
happened at the dawn of national public mental health care reform. First, as the result of a continuing 
emphasis on expansion in community services and funher deinstitutionalization, community or outpatient 
1' Source: TDMHMR Dirocl Putii.'111 Sel"\icc datahasc 
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funding and services began to outweigh inpatient funding and services in 1992. Second, the TDMHMR 
system began to emphasize management and preventative types of services by adding case management into 
the service array in the early I 990s26 . Third, the state developed and implemented Tennessee's Mental 
Health Master Plan (TDMHMR, 1992 [67]). The Plan was considered as the best practice guideline in 
establishing empirical quantitative norms for Tennessee's public mental health service system in order to 
deliver the most effective and appropriate service programs. With the implementation of the Master Plan 
TDMHMR was able to reduce outpatient service intensity27 (number of services per user per month) by 
about 50 percent. Unfortunately, by only regulating the service intensity, TDMHrvffi. was not able to release 
any financial pressure of cost containment under the FFS system. The FFS providers simply added more 
clients or users each month to make up the revenue difference due to the reduction in service intensity. 
Given continuous increases in mental health spending, the state effort at overhauling the Medicaid program 
prompted the initiative of managed mental health reform 
Taking advantage of the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA's) section 1115 research 
and demonstration waiver under the Social Security Act (Holahan, et al., 1995 [36)) and the momentum of 
national managed care reform, on January I, 1994, the state launched an ambitious public health care refom1 
program--TennCare. The refonn plan \Vas designed to not require new state tax and revenue in extending 
health coverage to not only the existing 800,000 Medicaid population, but also to approximately 400,000 
uninsured or uninsurable Tennesseans using a system of managed care (TennCare. 1996 [37]). 
In the beginning, Tennessee's behavioral health care reform proceeded through two parallel tracks 
One track was built on the carve-in concept 28 . General mental health and substance abuse service needs of 
TennCare consumers who were not previously served by TDMHMR were the responsibility of Managed 
Care Organizations (MCOs). Capitation payments to MCOs included $7.53 per member per month (a total 
:o P.L. 99-(,60 requires the establishment and implementation ofan organized, comprehensi\'e. and community-based system of care for 
the se\'ercly m1.-"lltally ill. P.L. 99-660 also specifically requires phasing in case managm1ent in public mmtal health sel'\ii;t."S lhat the 
plan shall prO\ide for case management sel'\ices for in<liYiduals with serious mental illness who rccei\'C substantial amounts of public 
funds OT SCl'\'iCCs. 
:• In this study, the term intensity is delin1.--<l as number of outpatient scr,iccs per user per month or number ofbcd-<lays per user per 
month 
28 I !ere the tenn" carw-in" refers to a s1tua11on \\ here a pre,·i,,us stand-af,,nc mental health cure program is t,,Ided into a managed c.arc· 
program under a single capillltion arrangement con.'Ting bolh physical health and m1.-·111al health care. 
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of$ l 08 million29 in capitation payments for MC Os to provide behavioral health services in the first year of 
TennCare operations) [37] to cover behavioral health benefits, excluding severe mental illness. Some MCOs, 
then, subcontracted with behavioral health care organizations to provide the services. 
The other track of state mental health care was the continuation of the state's traditional mental 
health and substance abuse care system. The TDMHMR system was to continue providing comprehensive, 
long-tenn and deep-end services to the system's existing population, regardless of their TennCare eligibility. 
Most of the consumers in the population are severely and persistently mentally ill adults and seriously 
emotional disturbed children. In essence, the TDMHMR tract could be viewed as a partial carve-out service 
arrangement to TennCare through the fee-for-services payment arrangement. 
The overall managed care refonn for state public behavioral health care came two and one-half 
years after TennCare's inception. In July 1996, after many months of debate and preparation, the state 
implemented a complete carve-out managed care program--the TennCare Partners Program (TPP)--to 
replace Tennessee's traditional public mental health care system. Under the new program, all TennCare 
beha,.,ioral health services were contracted to two consolidated behavioral health care organizations known 
as Premier Behavioral Health of Tennessee (Premier) and Tennessee Behavioral Health, Inc. (TBH). After 
the carve-out, MCOs and the TDMHMR were no longer responsible for mental health services, financially 
and administratively. At first, the BHOs received a single capitation rate of $22.93 (current dollars) per 
member per month (PMPM) for each ofTennCare's 1.2 million enrollees, regardless of whether they were in 
the priority population (SPMUSED) [37]. When BHOs complained about the revenue loss due to enrollment 
variations-1°, TennCare amended the blended single rate to a differentiated one for everyone in the SPMI and 
SED population. The TPP paid $319.4 l PMPM (per member per month) to the SPMI/SED members and a 
variable PMPM rate 11 to the non-SPMl/non-SED members, depending on the size of the payment to the 
priority population. 
l•• In current dollars 
'' With a singk hlcndcd rntc. a Bl l<) with a larger SPMI/Sl-:J) p.>pulation would face cost disad,·untagc e,en thouim the SPMI/Sl]) 
consumers were randomly assigned to the BI !Os b~· state. 
"Alkr u parn1cnt is made to the SPMI/SED population ($319.41 multiplied by numhcr ofSPM!/SED in the system). \\hatc,cr am,,unt 
is !ell from the capimtion revenue will be di,id<.-tl bas<.-tl on the si1.c of the non-SPMI/SED population to arrive at a ,·ariablc PMPM rate. 
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The TennCare Partners Program is a partial risk based managed care product. It is designed with 
major managed care principles. First, it is a carve-out program by way of risk-share contractingJ 2 
(TDMHMR, 1996 [38]). Second, it employs the capitation pricing mechanism. Under the TPP, all 
government funding sources are consolidated. A lump-sum payment in the fonn of negotiated capitation 
rates 33 is made to the BHOs monthly for delivering the contracted mental health and substance abuse benefit 
packages. Third, the TPP utilizes managed care techniques to monitor program quality, such as hiring 
external quality review organizations to conduct independent program reviews. Finally, the program 
encourages cost-efficient and effective care practices. For example, the TPP placed explicit terms in its 
contract with the BHOs to encourage inpatient to outpatient substitution. 34 
The TennCare's Partners Program (TPP) is a unique experiment m public mental health care 
reform. It is the only reform program that has been implemented in full scale, involving approximately 
400,000 uninsurable and uninsured beneficiaries, and all sectors of care--inpatient, outpatient and pharmacy. 
Several goals were clearly set for the TPP: cost-containment, at a minimum, slowing down the rate of 
growth; increasing access to mental health care, making mental health care available to 1.2 million TennCare 
enrollees: and improving quality of care. From a financial point of view, decision makers were determined to 
adopt a capitation payment method for Tennessee's public mental health care so that the drain on the state· s 
Medicaid resources could be plugged up. To many observers, even the program's critics, there was no doubt 
that the state had brought the Medicaid financing crisis under control initially, and did remarkably well in 
expanding health insurance coverage to a significant number of needy Tennesseans. Most of the concerns, 
not only to the TennCare managed care plan, but more so to the TennCare Partners Program, were centered 
on quality of care for the state's most vulnerable population. Are the consumers better off under managed 
!l The 'n)MI-IMR ond 111 I! l Contract (J. I 5.2) specifics the contractor shall he allcmed to retain only ten pcn .. -ent of the month!~· 
capitation umount paid by the Bureau of TennCare for administrati\'e and rnaI111gemcnt fees and profits, with the remaining 90 percent 
of the capitation payments being made a\'ailablc for prmidinp. or arranging din .. -ct mt.'lltal health and substance abuse sen ices to 
panicipants and payment of any applicable premium tax by the contractor to the State. Any and all benefit costs in excess of the amounts 
allowed pursuit to this contract shall be tl1e responsibility of the contractor. TDMI-IMR shall not be liable for any excess benclit .;osl~ 
distributed as u reduction to c<mtract pro,·idcrs. J\ny administrati,·e and management foes and profits exceeding the 10 percent limitation 
shall be borne by the contractor. 
'' There was also a reduction in the MC( ls· capitation paymc:nt of about $7 l'MPM. 
11 ·111c Tennessee Department of Mental I lculth M~'tltal Retardation and the Bl 10 Contrnct spt.-cilies that if 111edica/~1· appropriate for 
the patit:m, the !JI/() may mlllwrizt' .mhstit11tio11 of outpatiel/1 dt~\'5, pania/ ho.,pi1alizatim1 day.1, or rt'Jidc111ial 1reall11t'11/ tlay.,.fi,,· 
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care than they were with the traditional public health care system? ls cost containment the "initial effect," 
i.e., only a one-time savings at the beginning of the carve-out of managed care or a sustainable containment 
over time? In the end, people were concerned if the cost containment achievement was the result of quantity 
and/or quality reduction of care. Obviously, a reduction via efficiency improvements eliminating excessive 
utilization would be welcomed. On the other hand, if the reduction was at the expense of quality of care, the 
managed care approach of cost containment should be re-evaluated. 
This empirical research is set up to evaluate Tennessee's public mental health systems from a 
historical perspective. The study reviews cost-efficiency (a quantity or productivity issue of services) and 
cost-effectiveness (a quality or satisfaction issue of services) outcomes across two distinct systems of mental 
health care. One is the traditional public mental health care system, from January 1994 to June 1996, 
characterized by a FFS payment mechanism and a safe-net provider network. The other is the managed care 
system. from July 1996 to December I 998, distinguished by a capitation payment method and risk based 
contracting with private behavioral health care organizations. The status quo of the traditional mental health 
care FFS system serves as the baseline to evaluate the TPP's financial performance and outcomes 
conditioned on program pricing modalities: FFS vs. Capitation. 
1.3 Review of the Literature 
Among the community of health care professionals, there is little doubt in the effectiveness of 
capitation based managed care reform in fulfilling needs of immediate cost containment, although many do 
question whether managed care can sustain long-term cost savings, especially improving quality and access 
to care. In light of the debate on whether managed care will lead the United States to its health care 
prosperity, a significant amount of literature contributed to the discussion of cost- and quality-related 
outcomes of capitation-based managed care reform. 
Frank and McGuire conducted an independent evaluation of financial performance in the 
Massachusetts' managed public mental health program (Frank and McGuire, 1997 [39]). The reformed 
cm·,•rcd psychiatric i11palic111 facili~1- days. Tll'o .mhstirute dm·J ll'ill ,·01111/ a.< 011e i11palie11/ day. II he11 medica/~1· appropriare. S<'IYice., 
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program was implemented in July 1992. Massachusetts contracted with First Mental Health Inc., which did 
business in Massachusetts as Mental Health Management of America (MHMA), providing specialty mental 
health and substance abuse care to approximately 375,000 Medicaid eligible persons under the 
Massachusetts Medicaid program. Data on financial performance for the managed care organization 
obtained from documents related to 1995 rebidding of the contract and other publicly available documents 
were reviewed. The actual expenditures of the managed care program were compared with the projected 
expenditures based on expenditures from fiscal year 1992, the last full year before the carve-out contract, 
inflated by the medical care component of the Consumer Price Index. The authors found that spending by 
the managed care organization averaged about 25 percent lower than projected expenditures adjusted for 
inflation 30.8 percent in 1993, 26 9 percent in 1994, and 28.0 percent in 1995, although explicit financial 
incentives associated with the cost reduction were not strong inducements to attain these savings. Findings 
show that savings were maintained in the later years. Profit and loss features based on cost targets ,vere 
quite limited. The organization had a much greater incentive and opportunity to make profits by conserving 
its administrative costs rather than by controlling Medicaid claims' costs. 
Teh-wei Hu. Brian J. Cuffe!, and Mary C. Masland analyzed the impact of contracting with the 
private sector on unit costs of core services of public mental health sen.ices for fiscal year 1999 in California 
(Hu, Cuffe! and Masland, 1996 [ 40]). These core services were identified as inpatient care, individual 
therapy, crisis intervention, case management, medication management. rehabilitative day care, and intensive 
day care. The cost per unit of each service was estimated by dividing the total expenditures for that sen-·ice 
by the total units of service provided. The proportion of private contracting for each mental health service 
was estimated by dividing expenditures on contracted private mental health providers by total expenditures 
for each mental health service in county level mental health programs. Ordinary least-squares regression 
modeled the effect of county contracting on average mental health costs. The regression analysis controlled 
for population demographic variations. Results showed that the unit costs of four of the seven services had 
significant inverse relationships with the volume of the expenditures in private contracting: the higher the 
in a licensed suh:stimce LJhuse residential trc:1tmen1 fo.:ility may he suhstituted t,ir inpatient suhstan"e nhusc scn·ices. 
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percentage of total expenditures devoted to contracted services, the lower the unit costs for inpatient care, 
case management, medication management, and rehabilitative day care. Quantitatively, a 10 percent increase 
in private contracting would lead to approximately a three percent reduction in hospital inpatient unit costs 
and case management unit costs. Similarly, a 10 percent increase in private contracting would lead to a 2.5 
percent and 2. 7 percent reduction in medication management unit costs and rehabilitative day cart: costs, 
respectively. With respect to the other three services studied, individual therapy, crisis intervention, and 
intensive day care, no statistically significant relationships between cost and private contracting were found. 
Lindrooth, Nortona and Dickey analyzed how and why a Medicaid mental health carve-out 
achieved significant cost savings from the perspective of business strategy (Lindrooth, Norton and Dickey, 
[ 41 ]). They attribute the cost savings to a selective contracting effect, bargaining effect, and to utilization 
management. The cost savings attributable to the bargaining effect were measured as the difference between 
pre- and post-period per diem rates set by Medicaid in the pre-period and through bargaining in the post-
period. The carve-out managed care program can funnel patients to cost-effective providers to generate 
savings The cost savings attributable to utilization management were measured as the effect of the program 
on length of stay after controlling for the selection of hospitals. The research concluded that the contracting 
of hospitals accounted for about two-thirds of the cost savings, conditional on inpatient admission; another 
one-third of the cost savings through bargaining came in the form of lower per diem rates. Changes in the 
length of stay due to utilization management were negligible. The researchers, testing whether quality 
suffered from selecting hospitals that practice a shorter length of stay by analyzing the probability of 
readmission within 30 days in both the pre- and post-periods. they also analyzed the length of time between 
admissions in the pre-period as an indicator of quality. The data revealed that the probability of rapid 
readmission declined by 0.001 points in the post-period, and the mean length of community tenure (Cook. 
1992 [42]) between admissions of patients discharged was down from 188 days in the pre-period to 182 
days in the post-period. Although all changes in the quality indicators were not significant, these changes 
may be an indication of comparable quality of care both before and after capitation implementation. 
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From the long-term perspective, Goldman, McCulloch, and Sturm (Goldman, McCulloch and 
Stum1, 1998 [ 43]) tracked access, utilization, and costs of mental health care for a private employer over 
nine years during which mental health benefits were carved out of the medical plan and managed care was 
introduced. The study demonstrated that prior to the carve-out, mental health costs increased by around 30 
percent annually; in the first year after the change, costs dropped by more than 40 percent; in the six follow-
up years, costs continued to decline slowly. The study pointed out that the cost reduction was not 
attributable to decreased initial access since the number of persons using any mental health care increased 
following the change Instead, the cost reduction was the result of fewer outpatient sessions per user, 
reduced probability of an inpatient admission, reduced length-of-stay for an inpatient episode, and 
substantially lower costs per unit of service. 
A working paper by Roland Sturm of RAND made another effort at answering the question of the 
potential of long-term cost savings of managed behavioral health carve-out plans (Sturm, 1998 [ 44)). Stum1 
collected data on 52 managed behavioral health plans completing their first year of operation in 1991 or 
later. He followed through to the end of 1997. The findings of the research demonstrated that although it is 
well established that switching from unmanaged to managed behavioral health care leads to a dramatic 
immediate drop in health care costsJ~, the additional costs continued to decline during the following years of 
managed care, about I 0-15 percent with every doubling of the managed care experience. The research 
attributes these clinical cost reductions in beha\-ioral health plans to increases in organizational learning 
curves rather than to time trends and scale economies. With respect to the concerns of reduction in 
utilization and quality, Sturm's study also demonstrated positive quality improvement trends indicated by 
increased appropriateness of follow-up care after hospital discharges and reduced 30-day rehospitalization. 
To many, it is believed that "reducing admissions, length-of-stay, hospital days, or other services, 
and their associated expenditures, is the easy part of the process. Doing so in a manner that provides high-
quality care and good outcomes is the more difficult and more important task (Mechanic and McAlpine, 
1999 [45], p. 15)." Despite the difficulties in quantifying and demonstrating effectiveness and quality-related 
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issues, there is a significant amount of work focused on quality of care aspects in the recent literature to 
address the concerns pertaining to qualities of care of managed public mental health reforms. These studies 
focus on a wide range of measures, such as reductions in the rate and duration of psychiatric hospitalization, 
reduced clinical symptoms, increased social functioning, increased residential stability and independent 
living, increased ratings of objective and subjective quality of life, significantly greater levels of satisfaction 
with services, and overall cost savings. The majority of these studies were conducted either at clinical trials 
or on a survey basis. Most studies have the focus of treatment effectiveness and quality of care with the 
implicit assumption of cost-efficiency of the capitation system over the FFS system. Although there were 
mixed results in that regard, a majority of the related literature demonstrated comparable quality of care 
outcomes. 
Joan R. Bloom et al. presented some early findings for the first nine months of the state of 
Colorado's Medicaid capitation Pilot Project. implemented in selected areas of Colorado (Bloom, et al. 1998 
[46]). Capitation contracts were carved out to seven free-standing mental health assessment and service 
agencies (MHASAs}, which were the formations of a single C!\1HC, alliances of CMHCs, or joint ventures 
of CMHC( s) and a for-profit managed care firm. A random sample of 5 I 3 SPMI consumers was drawn to 
compare the utilization, cost, and outcomes of inpatient and outpatient services between the capitated 
MHASAs and the CMHCs for whom the services were still reimbursed with the FFS method. The consumer 
outcomes were collected through interviews on measures of symptoms, health status, functioning, quality of 
life, and consumer satisfaction The results of ordinary least squares regressions indicated consistent 
reductions in inpatient user costs and probability of outpatient use under capitation. Examinition of measures 
of outcomes across capitated areas suggested that samples drawn from the FFS setting and from the 
capitation setting were comparable in severity of psychiatric symptoms, function, health status and quality of 
life. In sum, the study found no changes in outcomes. 
Additional Colorado-based studies reinforced Joan R. Bloom and colleagues' general finding above 
(Warner and Huxley, 1998 [47]). Richard Warner and Peter Huxley conducted a clinical trial-based study on 
"/\ccorJing 10th<: outh,1r. the stud_, l<><:uSL·d ,,n only dinical costs and excluded administrntiH· cosls. \\hich ma~ ex1,criencc" sleeper 
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the outcomes of people v.ith schizophrenia before and after Medicaid capitation at a community agency in 
Colorado. Interview data were collected one year before and after implementation of Medicaid capitation for 
two sample groups of I 00 clients each. The results showed that psychopatholo!,,y was lower after capitation 
in most dimensions. The number of subjects admitted to the hospital during a six-month period beginning a 
year after capitation was 57 percent lower than in the equivalent period before capitation with no increase in 
the amount of outpatient treatment provided. Clients reported improved quality of life in the domains of 
work, finance, and social relations. Significant change in needs or service satisfaction was not detected. The 
research concluded that no evidence was found that Medicaid capitation had an adverse effect on the client 
population after one year of capitation implementation In fact, capitation lead to an efficient use of 
treatment. 
Funded by the Arizona Division of Behavioral Health Services and by a National Institute of Mental 
Health grant, Leff and his team evaluated the influence on service access, adequacy and appropriateness in 
four capitated public mental health programs (Leff, et al. 1994 [48]). The evaluation clients for the 
capitation programs were selected randomly from a pool of SMI (serious mental illness, age !(; 40) persons in 
FFS programs who were willing to participate in the capitation programs. The four capitation programs 
were compared to t\vo FFS programs where clients were randomly selected and assigned. Leff, et al. 
considered six variables related to services in their evaluation: probability of use, intensity of service, 
utilization, access to service, adequacy of amount of service, and appropriateness. The first three variables 
were the result of descriptive utilization statistics; the last three variables were evaluative and judgmental as 
the inputs of a consensus panel of a group of mental health professionals. They found that access, adequacy, 
and appropriateness were higher than for the peer fee-for-services programs, suggesting that the financial 
incentive in capitation was not a significant limiting factor for service access, adequacy and appropriateness. 
In all comparisons the capitation programs outperformed the FFS programs to a significant degree in all 
measuring areas. This evaluation concurs with other studies that the capitation programs decrease both the 
probability of use and intensity of service in the inpatient sector and increase probability of use and 
Jcdinc. 
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decreasing intensity of service in the outpatient sector. The overall monthly probability of use is 0.955, and 
the overall monthly service frequency is 2.72. By service domain, the evaluation shows that access, 
adequacy, and appropriateness were greatest for ambulatory treatment and least for inpatient and residential 
services. The highest scores were for case management services. Leff, et al. attributed the advantages of the 
capitation programs to the result of being motivated to improve upon pre-existing FFS programs with 
respect to service access and adequacy. On the cost side, excluding pharmacy, the average capitation rate for 
the four programs was $962 per client per month to cover the full complement of services of inpatient and 
outpatient care. The net income for the capitation programs was, on average, 20 percent of revenue. 
During the two-year follow-up period of the Monroe-Livingston demonstration Capitation Payment 
System (CPS}, Cole, et al. found that patients in the CPS experimental group had significantly fewer hospital 
inpatient days than those not in the CPS, although the two groups had no significant differences in 
functioning as measured by the Global Assessment Scale (GAS}, in level of symptoms as measured by the 
Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS), and the Scale for Assessment of Negative Symptoms (SANS). For 
the group of continuous patients in the CPS. defined as patients with more than 270 inpatient days during a 
three-year period before enrollment in the capitation experimental program in the CPS, Cole, et al. fi.1und 
that these patients not only experienced similar care outcomes, as the control group did, but also did so with 
a lower cost. They also enjoyed a significantly longer time out of the hospital before being rehospitalized 
(Cole, et al. 1994 [49]). 
In addition to a favorable financial evaluation received for the first year reform, the Massachusetts 
first-year experience on quality of care in Medicaid MH/SA managed care was also positive. In an 
independent review on program expenditures, access, and relative quality, Callahan, et al. concluded that for 
over a one-year period since the program's inception, state expenditures were reduced by 22 percent below 
the predicted levels without managed care, without any overall reduction in access or relative quality 
(Callahan, et al., 1995 [50)). The indicator that the review used to measure relative quality is the 30-day 
readmission rate. Overall, the rate dropped slightly from 19.9 percent in FY 1992 to 18.9 percent in FY 
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1993, with some group exceptions.16 The authors suggest that the savings realized in Massachusetts were 
generated by instituting rather dramatic shifts in treatment patterns for MH/SA problems. In particular, large 
savings stemmed from a reduction in acute inpatient care. The decline in outpatient spending resulted from a 
combination of reduced utilization and reduced prices to providers. Accompanying these important 
reductions in spending were some notable increases in specific treatment modalities. It has been suggested 
that the shifting of treatment settings is what enables a managed behavioral healthcare (MBHC) organization 
to maintain both access to care and quality of care while reducing overall costs. Also in line with Goldman's 
findings were reduced lengths-of-stay, lower prices, and fewer inpatient admissions as major factors in 
Massachusetts· first-year achievement. Along with substituting less costly types of 24 hour care for costly 
inpatient hospital care. the configuration of program services has changed. Of the 13 types of mental health 
services, six showed increases and seven decreases. It is worth noting that, although it was not included as a 
rnuntable factor for cost containment in the review, the program's overall service utilization per enrollee fell 
three percent below the expected volumes. 
Beginning in I 987, an early-stage capitation demonstration project was carried out in Hennepin 
county. Minnesota. Lurie and colleagues conducted a randomized trial to determine the effect of the 
capitation experiment on health outcomes of enrollment for chronically mentally ill (CMI) Medicaid 
recipients in prepaid plans versus traditional fee-for-service (Lurie, et al. 1992 [51 ]). In Hennepin county, 35 
percent of all Medicaid beneficiaries were randomly assigned to prepaid care administrated by four health 
plansl7_ These plans received a capitation payment targeted at 95 percent of estimated FFS costs, to care for 
enrolled individuals. At the baseline, 369 prepaid and 3 70 FFS clients were interviewed to collect outcome 
measures related to general health status, physical functioning, social functioning, and psychiatric symptoms. 
At the end of the demonstration period, 96 percent of the prepaid and 95 percent of the FFS clients were 
reinterviewed. A subset (3 70) of clients with schizophrenia was followed up 11 months after the return of 
"'I lowe\'cr, for the nondisahled group, C&/\ (children and adolescents) patients in particular. there was an increase. 
r ·111ese included a cowity-sponsored nctworl- I [M( >, a Blue Cross and Blue Shield-sponsored plan, and two smaller indc-pcndcnt 
prnctice ass.>eiation plans. Se,·en months after the demonstration hcgan, Blue Cross and Blue Shicl<l the plan with the most Mcdic;nd 
heneliciaries t..·nrolkd. annow1ced its intent lo\\ ithdraw from the demonstration. lk-causc of c,mccms about\\ hcthcr the ,,!her plans 
could accommodate the large number of disahlc<l enrollees w h,, woul<l nce<l to he transl.:rreJ. the state" ithdrew ull disahle<l clients 
frnm the demonstration allcr the lirst year. 
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the prepaid patients to FFS care. The effectiveness of cost-containment strategies was evident by the 
utilization data. Based on unadjusted, self-reported measures, fewer prepaid than comparison group 
enrollees received outpatient physical health care (61 percent versus 71 percent). The prepaid group also 
averaged four to five fewer annual visits and fewer inpatient admissions for physical health problems. A 
separate analysis based on claims data indicated a shorter length of stay for the prepaid group ( l.56 versus 
4.30 days). As for health outcome related measurements, the authors drew conclusions that there were no 
statistically significant differences between the prepaid and the FFS groups in general health or psychiatric 
symptoms from the baseline to the follow-up point (approximately 11 months into the capitation period). 
However, the GAS scores for clients with schizophrenia declined over the study period, with the prepaid 
plan clients experiencing a greater decline. The authors concluded that there was no consistent evidence of 
harmful effects in enrolling chronically mentally ill Medicaid clients into prepaid care, at least in the short 
run. 
Overall, the reviewed research on cost and quality aspects of mental health care refom1 
demonstrated that managed care can be not only an effective instrument in controlling cost, but also effective 
in delivering the desired outcome of quality of care. In achieving cost savings, most studies identified that 
decreased inpatient utilization (admissions, bed days), reduced outpatient service intensity (units of services 
per user), and effective contracting in reducing per diem rates and unit costs are the major process drivers. 
As to quality of care, managed care outcomes, through different measuring instruments, can be as 
comparable as those obtained under a FFS arrangement. 
1.4 About the Research 
Having been a close observer and information gleaner to Tennessee's public mental health care 
reform, this researcher sees the opportunity of and the significance in conducting an empirical and systematic 
research on outcomes of Tennessee's public mental health care reform program with respect to its cost-
efficiency and cost-effectiveness. This researcher believes that such research would be not only of empirical 
value in furthering development of public mental health policies, but would contribute also to the theoretical 
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development of health economics when cost-efficiencies and cost-effectiveness can be quantified, compared, 
and analyzed between two distinct economic pricing frameworks: Fee-For-Service (FFS) and capitation. 
Over a five-year study period, both the TDMHMR and the TPP have devoted tremendous effort at 
improving efficiency, quality, and access to public mental health care programs. Although there are still 
various concerns with the reformed program, it is this researcher's view that Tennessee has accumulated rich 
managed care experience and established a rather complete information infrastructure that would be worth a 
devoting research effort in bringing Tennesse's experience to the national front. 
This research has the following objectives: (1) Measure and compare cost-efficiencies and cost-
effectiveness of Tennessee's public mental health care system across two alternative public funding regimes: 
Fee-For-Service and capitation; (2) Test for possible structural change of public mental health care systems 
and the significance of the reform impact in both the inpatient care and outpatient care environments; (3) 
Analyze treatment, policy, and programmatic factors associated with the research findings; ( 4) Discuss 
economic and policy relevance, including implications of the research findings. 
This research can be distinguished from other research by several aspects. First, the research deals 
with a full carve-out, capitation-based public mental health care reform program. To date, it is one of two 
reform programs that have been implemented on a full carve-out basis. The operation of the reform is 
enriched with many areas of economic and policy interests: eligibility and enrollment, risk-based contracting 
and risk sharing. adverse selection, capitation determination. antitrust and market competition, resource and 
utilization optimization, and trade-off between efficiency and equality. Outcomes and experiences of such a 
reform trail should be valuable and informative for the future development of public mental health care 
policies. 
Second, the research is unique because it has broad orientation and deals with a large population. It 
covers program costs and service utilization activities from both inpatient and outpatient sectors through a 
five-year period, from 1994 to 1998. These five years were separated equally by two public mental health 
reigns-the IDMHMR and the TPP. On an annual basis, it deals with a program that covers about 1.2 
million enrollees. Over I 00,000 of these enrollees use specialized mental health services with more than SO 
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percent of them assessed as SPMI/SED. Further, population-based claims and encounter data are 
aggregated monthly to obtain summary statistics in cost, utilization, and quality for the TDMHMR (FFS) 
system and the TPP (capitation) system. Such a data and system structure allows hypothesis testing for 
structural change in cost-efficiency (a quantity and cost issue in mental health care) and cost-effectiveness (a 
quality of care and cost issue in mental health care). Few studies were able to offer such a comparison due 
to difficulties in linking large population data from pre- to post-reform periods at the program level. 
This research is performed independently from the perspective of this researcher. Although 
privileged in using the state's information system and documentation to accomplish this dissertation, this 
researcher, not the state, will be responsible for the data and information accuracy provided in the research. 
For proprietorship concerns, raw data used in this study will not be made public in this manuscript. Further, 
it is the researcher's intent to solely delegate this research for the purpose of an academic achievement, and 
reserve the right to distribute and publish this dissertation if the State gives further consenting in that regard. 
Chapter one discussed common cost drivers of public health care financing from the 
perspective of demand and supply in the mental health care market. On the demand side, it is recognized 
that the mental health care system still faces the reality of growing unmet health care demand, 
indicated by the increasing sizes of the uninsured and uninsurable population, and by shortages of 
providing sufficient and effective services to consumers under care. Pressures from the supply side were 
attributed mainly to funding adequacy, policy desibrn on funding distribution, and payment 
methodology. Several factors were identified as major forces in driving up expenditures on public mental 
health care, including transferred or adversely selected demand, inadequate and indirect financial incentives, 
moral hazard, and high technology and high cost associations. 
Development and implementation of the Mental Health Master Plan, TennCare refonn, and 
TennCare Partners Program reform were considered as significant milestones in the l 990s in the history of 
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Tennessee's public mental health care. The chapter discussed the state's effort at developing and 
implementing the Master Plan to improve system efficiencies under a Fee-For-Service payment arrangement. 
Although there was about a SO percent reduction in outpatient service intensity (number of services per user 
per month), neither volume nor spending on inpatient and outpatient care was reduced. A reform proposal-
the TennCare Partners Program-was initiated at the time TennCare was implemented in January 1994, and 
finally being executed on July I, 1996 replacing the traditional FFS system. The capitation-based managed 
mental health care program was carved-out to two Behavioral Healthcare Organizations (BHOs): Premier 
Behavioral Health of Tennessee (Premier) and Tennessee Behaviroal Health, Inc. (TBH). The reformed 
system, known as the TennCare Partners Program (TPP), offered mental health coverage to about one-
fourth of Tennesseans, including 800,000 Medicaid eligible and 400,000 uninsured and uninsurable. 
This chapter presented literature reviews on a series of empirical studies dealing with cost-
containment and quality of mental health care issues. Overall, the research on cost and quality aspects of 
mental health care refom1 demonstrated that managed care can be not only an effective instrument in 
controlling cost, but also effective at delivering the desired outcome of quality of care. In achie\.ing cost 
savings, most studies identified that decreased inpatient utilization (admissions, bed days), reduced 
outpatient service intensity (units of services per user), and effective contracting were the major process 
drivers. As for the quality of care, most studies demonstrated that the quality outcomes from managed care 
programs were comparable to those obtained under a FFS arrangement. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
Chapter two discusses definitions of efficiency and effectiveness measurement. A brief discussion is 
made about the advantages of using recidivism as the quality indicator. Data collection, regressions, and 
testing techniques will be discussed. 
2.1 Measurement of Cost-Efficiency and Cost-Effectiveness 
Although in many situations the terms "efficiency" and "effectiveness" appear interchangeable, they 
are used distinctively in this research. The term "cost-efficiency" as used here is defined to measure the 
relative volume of service utilization of mental health care on the base of public mental health care 
expenditures. The term "cost-effectiveness" is defined to measure the quality of care on the base of public 
mental health expenditures. 
The intention of using cost-effectiveness measurement is to understand whether and, if so, to what 
extent the quality aspects of one system of mental health care may differ from another system of mental 
health care; and whether and, if so, to what extent, the lower costs realized by one health care system are 
due to purchases of fewer quantities or lower quality products, or the result of service efficiency 
improvements A dynamic link between effectiveness and efficiency measures can be established according 
to the proposition of substitution or trade-off effects between quantity and quality aspects of health care 
products. The formation of a three-dimensional production system is necessary in demonstrating the 
interrelationship between quality and quantity within a system of health care production. 
An example of such a three-dimensional system is presented in Figure 6, where axis x represents 
the quantity dimension of health care production; axis z represents the quality dimension; and axis y 
represents the price dimension. Assume that a preferred location of a system of health care production was 
anchored at position H(x,p.y), the traditional price and quantity relationship would be H's projection point 
(x,y) on the price-quantity surface indicating the cost-efficiency of the system of health care production H, 
while the price and quality relationship was H's projection point (y,z) on the price-quality surface indicating 
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Fii,irc 6: Three-Dimensional Health Care Production S~·stcm 
would represent the trade-off or substitution relationship bet,veen the quantity and quality attributes of the 
system of health care production. Conceptually, "quality cannot be provided with inadequate resources; 
however, more may not be better. Efficiency can lead to better care. Whenever ·unnecessary services· are 
avoided, there is improvement in care because the risks associated with those services are eliminated. 
However, excluding necessary procedures will decrease quality. In mental health, there are large variations 
in the lengths and intensity of treatment without significant differences in outcome (Savitz, 1992 (52), p. 
45)_·· 
In essence. this analysis of cost-effectiveness of public mental health care has very much in common 
with cost-benefit analysis. Benefits and effectiveness alike are usually secondary outcomes of economic 
activities lacking in unique indicators that would fully reflect the complexities of the benefits or effectiveness 
of economic activities. Here, the cost-effectiveness of a system of mental health care is concerned with the 
quality of mental health care production and is designed to be measured by quality-related indicators Dollar 
values will be explicitly placed on selected indicators so that quality aspects of care can materialize as well. 
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For example, in cost-effectiveness tenns, one could compare a six-month symptom stabilization period per 
$1,000 depression treatment cost from visiting Dr. A versus a three-month symptom stabilization period per 
$1,000 depression treatment cost from visiting Dr. B, ceteris paribus. Or, x dollars spent on a patient's 
mental health treatments resulted in a 60-day community tenure (Cook, 1992 (42], p. 184)38 after discharge 
versus a 30-day community tenure, holding everything else the same. In each case, we would conclude there 
was a 50 percent difference in the cost-effectiveness of the system of care. 
To summarize, cost-efficiency measurements defined in this study will evaluate the financial 
pe,formance of a system of mental health care production in tangible units of traditional health care output; 
cost-effectiveness measurements will value quality attributes of health care production on the bases of unit 
program expenditures. Perhaps two things can differentiate the two measures most. One is the subject of 
purchasing, whether the subject fits the traditional dimension of health care production. such as bed days or 
it fits the quality dimensions of the production, such as consumer satisfaction. Second. effectiveness 
measures are usually secondary results of primary health care production activities. Recidivism rates, for 
example, are dependent on the completion of primary health care activities, such as hospital admissions. 
treatments, and discharges. In other words, the recidivism outcome will not exist unless these primary health 
care activities are carried out. 
In this study, the measurements of cost-effectiveness and cost-efficiency of the TDMHMR system 
of mental health care and the TPP system of mental health care are aggregated and compared at the program 
level, not the provider level. The denominators of both measures are expenditures, or equivalently, costs at 
the program or payor level. For the TD1\1HMR system, the denominator is total program expenditures 
appropriated to CMHAs and RMHis through the TDMHMR after administrative costs. For the TPP system, 
it is the total TPP expenditures paid to BHOs, less estimated administrative costs 39 and phannacy costs. 
Traditional health care output as the numerators of cost-efficiency measures can be estimated in 
three tiers: covered lives or enrolled members, served lives or program users, and service utilization. The top 
tier output is the number of lives or members covered by a program during a defined time period. From a 
'""111e period het\\ccn l\\O inpatic·nt c·ncountcrs 
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payer's perspective, average expenditure per covered life per month or per eligible member per month 
(PMPM) directly indicates the purchasing power of payors' investments in terms of consumers' entitled 
access to public mental health care. The second tier in output is the number of consumers who are actually 
being served by the system during the 
measuring time frame, termed "served 
lives:· or ·'program users" here. This 
measure disperses program expenditures 
among the actual users, arriving at the 
average program expenditure per user per 
month (PUPM). The third tier in the output 
measures service utilization rather than 
access After the annual program 
expenditures are divided between the 
inpatient and outpatient sectors across 12-





(lhkll.'S. Sl."Nmi, Vi'iits, Pmoirnm-, t1c.) 
(fO'OOTtlUe ri mt, lie.) 
program expenditures or costs are then estimated based on service utilization trends of inpatient bed days, 
outpatient service and treatment sessions. Consequently, four basic cost-efficiency measures are evaluated: 
(I) program expenditure per member per month (PMPM); (2) program expenditure per user per month 
(PUPM); (3) program expenditure per outpatient session (unit cost); and (4) program expenditure per 
inpatient bed-day (per diem rate). In essence, these efficiency measurements can be considered as the 
observed maximum shadow prices of mental health care products since they are measured on the base of 
program funding or expenditures and not on the base of true production costs incurred at the provider level. 
In general, the quality related measures could be classified into three basic groups: consumer and 
family satisfaction; outcome of services and treatments; and appropriateness of process-of-care, as 
summarized in Table I below. 
" Estimated at ten percent llf total re,·enues, according to the Tl )Ml IMR and Bl 10 conlrnct 
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Table I: Quality Indicators of Mental Health Care 
Cate2ory Indicator Measurin2 Method 
Consumer , Levels of consumer/family satisfaction Survey 
Satisfaction Ratings of quality oflife Survey 
Complaint and appeal statistics Administrative Data 
I Plan turnover rates (due to satisfaction concerns) Administrative Data 




--Global Assessment Scale (GAS) for measuring overall 
severity of psychiatric disturbance 
Symptom stabilization or reduction: Clinical Review, 
--Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale Claims/Encounters 
I --clinical status improvement, such as change from a clinical 
f related group 1 (severe) status to a clinical related group 3 
I (moderate)_ status 
, --Commuruty tenure 
j --Hospital/Institution recidivism rate (>= 60 
I readmission) 
: Usage of preventative care 
I Usage of routine care management services 
day\ 
! Claims/Encounters 
( case t Claims/Encounters 
I I management. medication management) 
1 Hos ital/Institution recidi\ism rate(<= 30 da · readmission) 
I 
! Claims/Encounters 
Follow-up after discharge 1 Claims/Encounters 
Consumer satisfaction-related indicators usually reflect consumers' experiences on the overall 
perfom1ance of health care systems, ranging from financing to management to service utilization and 
treatment. Service- and treatment-related outcomes directly measure service and treatment effectiveness of 
mental health care. Functional improvements, for example, in patients' abilities to handle their daily personal 
and social activities, are often considered as a desired indicator of quality of care (Cole, et al. 1994 [ 49]; 
Overall and Gorham, I 962 [53]; Andreasen, I 982 [54]; Endicott, Spitzer and Fleiss, [55]) Process-of-care 
related measures, compared to the satisfaction and the service- and treatment-related outcome measures, 
indirectly gauge the effectiveness of mental health care. The rationale for using such measurements is based 
on the belief that the appropriateness of process-of-care will contribute positively to quality of care. An 
example of this is appropriately using preventative and routine care to reduce probabilities of symptom 
deterioration or re-occurrences of crisis episodes. When first hand quality of care indicators are not 





















preventative care and maintenance-type services, can be instrumental in predicting the status of quality of 
care. 
ln this research, claims and encounter-based hospital recidivism rates are used to measure the 
effectiveness of a system of mental health care. Several justifications prompted this selection. First, 
systematic inpatient claim or encounter data are available for compiling the readmission rates for both the 
TDMHMR period and the TPP period. The application of such large-scale, encounter-based quality 
indicators brings consistency and uniqueness to the econometric evaluation of mental health care. Second, 
since readmission rates can be measured in various intervals (30-day readmission rate, 60-day readmission 
rate, 90-day readmission rate, and so on}, they can provide the possibility to measure short-run and long-run 
effectiveness of a system of care. There are some discussions about using the very short-term, typically, less-
than-30-day readmission rates, in measuring the quality of treatment. ln some mental health professionals' 
views, the 30-day readmission rate presents the indication of poor treatment planning, particularly preceding 
inpatient care which would result in premature discharges. Consequently, these premature discharges could 
be considered an issue of appropriateness of process-of-care rather than a poor treatment outcome. 
Regardless of which category the 30-day readmission rate belongs to, the 30-day readmission rates are 
presented in this research along with the 60-, and 90-day readmission rates in evaluating the cost-
effectiveness of the mental health care programs. Third, it is this researcher's opinion that hospital recidivism 
rates, especially mid- and long-tenn, can measure the effectiveness of the system of care beyond the 
preceding inpatient treatment point'° (Hafemeister and Banks, 1996 [56]; TDMHMR, 1992 [67]). They can 
be used to measure the effectiveness of integration and coordination of inpatient and outpatient care, 
especially when such interactions are promotional goals of a system of care. lt is clear that any poorly 
planned treatment elements such as premature discharge, delayed follow-up treatment and services, or 
insufficient community care management after discharge would result in some earlier than necessary 
readmissions 41 (Dincin, et al. 1993 [57]). Hence, the longer a discharged individual stays in the community 
10 The Master Plan (p. 1 ): .. lhc c'(plicit goal of community treatment \\as to keep people out of hospital settings. an<l rt-ci<li\·ism \ms 
the primal} measure ol'system effecti\·eness.·· 
11 Dincin, ct al. e\·ali.wtc<l \\ hcthcr use or inpatient sen-ices at a stale hospital among pcrs.>ns in one of the h,,spital"s catchment ureas 
who were al high risk for rchospituli/alion \\as rc<lucc<l by implcm~,11.Ulton ol'an asscrti,·c commwuty treatment program. "The study 
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without rapidly relapsing back to an inpatient facility, the stronger the indication of a more successful or 
efficacious system of care. Founh, recidivism rates are more stringent measurements for effectiveness of 
care than other system-wide quality indicators. In health care, especially in mental health care, populations of 
consumers who frequently use inpatient services are considered high-risk, both medically and financially. 
Consequently, using recidivism rates derived from such a high-risk population to generalize the outcomes of 
quality of care would place health care systems in a more challenging position than using measures derived 
from a general population. 
Recidivism rates have long been used in mental health literature for measuring inpatient treatment 
eflectiveness 42 (McGlynn, I 992 [58]). Close to the objective of this research, Hafemeister and Banks have 
suggested using recidivism rates to assess treatment program effectiveness or to examine such treatment at 
the macro or system-wide level, although their work is limited to inpatient facilities only (Hafemeister and 
Banks, 1996 [56]). To date, there were many studies using recidivism rates to measure effectiveness of care 
in the context of a system of integrated and coordinated care. However, there is not much work linking 
program expenditures and mental health care outcomes together in evaluation largely because the systematic 
data on financial information and utilization are often hard to come by together. 
The reliability of using readmission rates to measure the effectiveness of a system of care is highly 
dependent on the mobility of the population under consideration. Ideally, all patients in the discharge and 
readmission population should exhibit no large eligibility gaps throughout each measuring term; otherwise, 
the measurements could be misleading if long gaps between discharges and readmissions are due to 
treatment received elsewhere. For the TDMHMR and the TPP mental health care systems, the users in the 
public mental health system, especially ones in the high-risk population, are usually system dependent. As an 
example, high-risk consumers in the TDMHMR system made up about 90 percent of the TPP high-risk 
found that the asserti\·e community treatment program significantly reduced use of inpatient days an<l impro\·ed community care. The 
utilization of h,:<l-days by persons in the program· s catchment area was reduced by 28% in the third year aft,:r program implementation. 
This researcher also conducted an analysis of cost-<:lfoctivL'llCSs of using outpatient sef\iccs to reduce inpatient utili1.ation within tl1c 
Tennessee public (FFS) mental health system. The findings indicate that the aYcrage length of commWlil)· tenure was positiYcly 
correlated with the aYcragc frequL'llCY of outpatiL'llt SCT\ices. The measure of aYeragc length of commWlity tenure was significantly 
different hct\\ccn recidi,ists with pre-admission conununity supports ( I 80 Jays) and rL-cidi\ists \\ithout such suppons ( 108 days). 
,i Mc(ilynn stated that while hospitali1.ation is im:orpornted into some outc,,mc scales, it is used directly as a marker of outcomes 
(generully neg11ti\·c). There arc at least four ways of using hospitali1ation as an outcome measure: number ofhospitali111tions anmwlh·. 
time inlL·rval between hospitalizations; duration ofhospitali1.ation; and type ofa<lmission (rnlw1tary \'Crsus inrnlWltary). 
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rur1d.11io11 
,\ddit1onal data ,111d ,tatislical focts .ire prnvukd 1l11011ghrn11 llw, research \~hencvcr 1t is .1\ailablc 10 
re1nti>rcc analvscs and lindings hir instance. the perccntat;es of 1nonthlv --:tfcetivc .1dm1ss1011s or disd1aruc:-. 
Jctined as the ratio of total ;1dmissions ,H discharges deducting the number ,if readmissions Ii-om !he lolal 
admissions m discharges. arc rrcscnted in Chaptt:r ,. both for the rDMll\1R and the TPP systems. in order 
lo reinforce the suitability of using recidivism rates in the cost-etlccuveness analysis 
2.2 Data Preparation 
Data used in this research cover a series of longitudinal. linam:ial, and utilization information for 
Tennessee's public mental health care svstem from January 1994 to December 19'>8 l'he tirst .10 months of 
data are associated with the FFS svstem under the administration of the TOMI IMR. The rcmainmg JI) 
months of data arc associated with the capitation system administrated by the TPP The payment 
definitions used here arc based on payment methodologies set at the program level. i e . the payment 
arrangement between the TDMHMR to CHMAs and RMl-fls. and the payment arrangement between 
the TPP and BHOs, regardless of the payment methods existing between the CMHAs and their 
providers or between the BHOs and their providers. In fact. under the capitation system. there are 
substantial FFS payment arrangements among the BHOs and their contracted providers. mostly in the 
inpatient care sector (Figure 7). 
The TDMHMR financial data on program expenditures were gathered and consolidated from 
vanous TDMHMR documents. Although the inpatient and outpatient expenditures were documented 
separately, monthly distributions were not available at the TDMHMR program level. However, since the 
TDMHMR system was a FFS system and payments were made based on services rendered. it was 
reasonable to divide the yearly expenditures based on the volume of services each month across the 12-
month period. This volume-based approach was used in distributing the annual TDMHMR program 
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Fi~un, 7: P11J·ment A rran~cments in the TDMHMR llnd the TPP •J·•tems 
The TPP financial data for program expenditures were from TennCare capitation payment reports. 
Lump-sum capitation payments were made to the BHOs each month. With capitation payments, the BHOs 
were expected to cover inpatient, outpatient and pharmacy services. The BHOs' responsibility for paying for 
phannacy services was relaxed twelve months into the program, then totally removed from the third year 
contract. Consequently, capitation payments to the BHOs were also reduced accordingl/ 3. For the 
TDMHMR system, pharmacy expenditures were not budgeted in TDMHT\-1R expenses at all, thus, not 
recorded and documented in the TDMHMR infonnation system. To make the expenditures comparable 
between the TPP and the TDMHMR systems, pharmacy costs were deducted from total BHO capitation 
payments based on pharmacy payment information generated through the pharmacy encounter files. 
Furthennore, the monthly distribution of the expenditures between the inpatient and outpatient sectors was 
not known at the TPP level. Since payment arrangements from the BHOs to the inpatient facilities were still 
FFS in nature, and the payment infonnation was documented by the encounter system, it was feasible to 
"By SJ PMPM 
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estimate monthly actual spending on the TPP's inpatient care. Further, upon arriving at the inpatient 
expenditures, it was appropriate to divide the monthly capitation payment between the inpatient and 
outpatient sectors via deduction of encounter-based inpatient costs from monthly program expenditures. 
All expenditures used in this analysis were adjusted for inflation using the medical care services 
component of the consumer price indices, published by Bureaus of Labor Statistics. 
Data for covered lives or enrolled members were compiled from the TDMHMR's census 
information system and TennCare's eligibility (enrollment) information system. The TDMHMR census 
information system was a register documenting the TDMHMR recipients' basic demographic and financial 
information. Since the TDMHMR system was not operated as an insurance system per se, the term 
"covered lives·· or members, is loosely applied to the system to arrive at a potential population needing 
care. Nevertheless, covered lives under both systems were counted as individuals who had open census or 
enrollment records during each measurement period. On one hand, the statistics of covered lives may not 
be quite comparable in this research because eligibility criteria have changed dramatically from the 
TDMHMR system to the TPP system. On the other hand, the expansion of the eligible population from 
about 130,000 lives in the TDMHMR program to about I .2 million lives in the TPP program has been 
viewed as a dramatic success for Tennessee's managed public mental health care reform. 
The number of served lives or program users in the TDMHMR system is complied from the Direct 
Patient Sen~ce (DPS) database and the TDMHMR Census database. The DPS database houses the 
outpatient service utilization information under the FFS system, while the TDMHMR census database 
houses general census information on the TDMHMR consumers, as well as claims information on 
inpatient or institutional care. The population of served lives or users is defined as unduplicated consumers 
who have used either inpatient or outpatient services, or both, during each measuring period. The number of 
served lives in the TPP system are compiled from the TPP inpatient and outpatient encounter database 
using the same population definition, but only those for whom claims were paid. Consumers who used 
only the services that have been denied payment by BHOs are not be included in the user 
population. 
40 
The same data bases used for identifying program users are used to produce inpatient and 
outpatient service utilization statistics. Major categories of outpatient services include therapy (individual, 
family, and group), day treatment, medication management, case management, crisis intervention, 
evaluation, intake and assessment, and transportation, also, supportive community services (housing and 
employment). All claim or encounter-based services, regardless of the category, are aggregated by month for 
each program by production sector. For the TPP system, again, only paid44 encounters or claims are 
included. 
Hospital admission data are extracted from the TDMHMR census database and the TPP's inpatient 
encounter and claim databases. Monthly admissions are indexed from previous dates of discharges of 
patients; so the lengths between the readmisiion and the patient's previous discharge can be measured. 
Readmissions in a month can then be counted and classified as 30-, 60-, 90-day readmissions accordingly. It 
is recognized that since the TPP's encounter system is a new system, the initial readmission counts are 
expected to be low; though in relative measures, such as readmission per 1,000 members or per 1,000 
patients discharged, the rates should be comparable. Further, it is also recognized that under a managed 
care system, hospital readmissions may be reduced due solely to restrictions on hospital utilization. As data 
indicate here, admissions in general under the TPP system actually increased. Thus, it is believed that the 
managed care practices have not had discriminative influences on patient readmissions. 
2.3 Multiple Variable Regressions, Hypotheses, and Testing 
Cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness analyses are based on estimations of multi-variable, linear 
regressions of service utilization and quality of care functions. For inpatient and outpatient utilization 
regressions, the volume of service utilization measures (IPDA YS, OPSVC) are assumed to depend on 
program funding (IPFUND, OPFUND), population of consumers in care (IPSVD, OPS VD), and whether or 
not utilization is impacted by managed mental health care reform. Because the state public mental health care 
system is built on the basis of government funding, and because the primary objective of this research is to 
"Some cl~ims an: denied for p11vmcnt m Bl ]Os 
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determine whether or not public investment in mental health care can be used more efficiently and effectively 
when distribution or payment methodology changes, program funding is considered as the key exogenous 
factor in the utilization and outcome regressions. In practice, both the TDMHMR and the TPP systems 
featured pre-budgetary processes. For the TDMHMR system, program expenditures or funding were usually 
budgeted ahead of time based on the funding availability of various resources. Utilization levels at CMHAs 
and RMHls were also often planned in advance based on experience of past utilization and revenue 
expectations. For the TPP system, program expenditures were calculated on a capitation base and prepaid to 
the BHOs at the beginning of each payment period. Because the IDMHMR was a FFS system with not-for-
profit safe-net providers, providers would usually produce to the point where all available funding was 
consumed. Therefore, it is expected that the correlation between the TDMHMR utilization and the 
TDMHMR funding would be positive under normal circumstances. For the TPP system, the public mental 
health care program \Vas administered by for-profit business entities. Once revenues were advanced in 
payment, the BHOs would manage utilization in order to maximize profits and maintain quality of care, 
while minimizing financial and contractual risks. How utilization would respond to program funding under a 
capitation system is under scrutiny in this research. In the short run, one may observe none or an inverse 
relationship between utilization and program expenditures. In the long run, this researcher believes that a 
positive relationship between utilization and program expenditure would still dominate because program 
funding should be eventually adjusted to meet demand in an efficient manner. However, the degree of 
responsiveness between utilization and program expenditures given by a capitation system may not be as 
strong as a one given by a FFS system. Any change in policy, management, medical care technology, or 
scale of economy could also alter a positive relationship toward zero, or even a negative one. Given long 
enough observation periods, the positive correlation should then resume through funding adjustments. 
The population of consumers in need of care is also considered as an independent variable affecting 
utilization outcomes. In general, it is assumed that utilization and population of consumers in need of care 
are correlated positively: the more people in need of care, the higher the utilization volume. Like the funding 
and utilization relationship, exceptions may exist also when policy and management strategies, such as 
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utilization management in relative service intensity, shift dramatically, and when an observation period is 
short. A typical example to demonstrate this is the level of outpatient service utilization and the size of the 
population in services during the final days of the TDMHMR period. Under the influence of the Master Plan. 
the intensity of outpatient utilization was dramatically reduced while the size of the user population actually 
increased because the CMHAs had to add more patients on service lists in order to prevent potential revenue 
loss caused by reductions in service intensity. 
At the focus of this study, capitation-based managed care reform is expected to influence the 
utilization outcome significantly as well. At a minimum, it is believed that managed care would reduce 
unnecessary utilization in the initial stage of transition from a traditional FFS system to a capitation system. 
The structures of the inpatient and outpatient utilization functions are presented below. 
Inpatient Utilization Function 
The restricted form of the function is: 
0 1,PDAYS " 1 = 1;11 
L!PJJAYS ,2J LO 
!PFUND 11 
!/'FUND 12 
IPS11J 11 ] a,, I a,1 I IPS11J 12 /JJ/'11~,D + µ 
The unrestricted form of the function is: 
\IPDAYS 11 ]=\i,1 
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I 2 _JI '2 
I p 1/'Fl".\"/J ·' 2 
L /J /!'SID ·' 2 
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where f PJ)A YS is monthly aggregated bed-days incurred at institution or inpatient facilities; !PFUND 
represents monthly public program expenditures in inpatient care; /PSI ·n represents monthly patients served 
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or user census in inpatient care; I I is the time indices for the TDMHMR period (January 1994 to June 
1996). and 12 is the time indices for the TPP period (July 1996 to December 1998). 
Outpatient Utilization Function 
The restricted form of the function: 
[OPSVCS 
11 ] = [i" 
OPSVCS 12 0 
0 OPFUND 11 
OPFUND ,2 
The unrestricted fonn of the function: 
a,1 
OPSVD 11 ] a, 2 
OPSVD 12 PoPFUND 
+µ 
P0Ps1v 
0 0 j ()J>,\'VC5,' rl] = [i,1 
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P,,,:·:,, "l 
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a,2 1· . _, 
p Ol'FC\D .r 2 
p 0/'SIV .I 2 j 
In these equations. OPSI 'CS is monthly aggregated number of outpatient services; Oi'Fl/11/D 
represents monthly public program expenditures on outpatient care; OPSVD represents monthly patients 
served or user census in outpatient care; ti is the time index for the TDMHMR period, and 12 is the time 
index for the TPP period. 
Quality of Care Functions 
The restricted form of the function (30-day readmissions): 
[ RCID 30 IJPT, 1 ] = [i,1 
RC/I) 30/JPT, 2 0 
0 fl!NDPT r1 
FUN/JP?' 12 
Yri 
SVDPT, 1 ] r,2 
S'VDl'T r2 Y FL'.V/)PT + J.I 
r SJ1>/T 
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The unrestricted form of the function (30-day readmissions): 
[ RC'/D
30DPT, 1 ] = [i,1 
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The restricted form of the function (60-day readmissions): 
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The unrestricted form of the function (60-day readmissions): 
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The restricted form of the function (90-day readmissions): 
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The unrestricted form of the function (90-day readmissions): 
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In these equations, R('lf)J0DP7: RC/D60DPJ: and RCID90DPT are monthly aggregated number 
of 30-, 60-, and 90-day readmissions; Fl!NDPT represents monthly total program expenditures of mental 
health care; S/1JP/"represents monthly patients served or user census in both inpatient and outpatient care; 
I 1 is the time indices for the TDMHMR period, and 12 is the time indices for the TPP period. 
Two hypotheses will be tested to provide inferences for cost-effectiveness and cost-effectiveness 
analyses: 
Hreot/iesis I: Tlte parameters of tl,e TPP (capitation-based managed care) form of tire 
utilization .function.,; will not he ,lif.ferent from the parameters of the TDMHMR (FFS) form of the 
utilization functions. 
llreothesis 2: The parameters of the TPP (capitation-base,/ managed care) form of tire quality 
of mre function will not he ,l[fferentfrom the parameters of the TJ>,\IHMR (FFS) form of the t/tllllity of 
care function. 
All hypotheses are tested using Chow tests (testing for structural change). The critical value of the 
F-statistic with three degrees of freedom and 54 observations is 2. 76 at 5 percent level of significance. 
Access-related cost-efficiencies are tested with analysis of variance analyses (ANOV A) to compare 
the cost-efficiencies before and after managed care refonn in terms of nominal and positive access of 
consumers to public mental health care systems. 
Along with hypothesis testing of the utilization and quality of care functions, funding-related 
parameters are also compared between the two systems to assess the direction and magnitude of the 
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reform's impact. Two immediate assessments are evaluated in the regressions. First, has managed care 
reform had any structural impact on Tennessee's mental health care system in terms of its cost-efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness of behavioral healthcare? Second, if the answer to the first question is "yes," in what 
direction and magnitude has managed care impacted Tennessee's public mental health care system? Or, has 
reform advanced the system of cost-effectiveness 9 If so, how significant is it? 
2.4 Regression Specifications 
In all regressions it is assumed that the dependent variables are directly and linearly influenced by 
two important factors: program expenditures and mental health care demands, measured by served 
populations at each measuring point. The factor of managed reform is not explicitly expressed in the 
regressions, rather. is illustrated through testing the structural changes of the utilization and quality of care 
functions using pre- and post-managed care data. Several concerns, such as multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation are examined45 for possible violations of the basic assumptions of 
classical normal linear regressions. 
Concerns of Multicollinearity It is likely that a certain degree of multicollinearity exists 
between the explanatory variables program expenditure and measures of service demand, such as lives 
covered or served, because the programs (TDMHMR or TPP) were usually budgeted in advance with 
some knowledge of current or projected population size. To quantify the degree of multicollinearity, 
total program expenditure, program inpatient expenditure, and outpatient expenditures were regressed 
with respect to served lives, inpatients served, and outpatients served. Also, Pearson correlation 
coefficients were examined for these paired explanatory variables. On a scale of O to 1, the closer to 
zero the correlation coefficients and the R-squares are, the less collinear the paired variables. The results 
are presented in Table 2. Both the Pearson correlations and R-squares indicate limited multicollinearities 
between these paired explanatory variables. 
·" ll1csc examinations were bascd on the ra1,· data hcforc the inflation adjustments. 
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Table 2: Testing of Multicollinearity 
I Explanatory Variables I Pearson 
I Results of Paired Regressions i 
Correlation R-square F Value Prob>F I 
ALLSVDffOTFUND 0. 12841 0.0165 0.972 0.3282 I 
OPSVD/OPFUND 0.65985 0.4354 44.729 0.0001 I 
I PS VD/IPFUND -0.36087 0. 1302 8.684 0.0046 i 
Concerns of Heteroscedasticity Heteroscedasticity concerns the disturbance term of the 
regressions being spread out unequally, so that the property of homoscedasticity for the ordinary linear 
square (OLS) residuals is violated. Heteroscedasticity is not a real concern in this research since the research 
does not involve cross-sectional data where hederoscedasticity is more likely to occur, as opposed to time-
series data. Nevertheless, the plotting of squared estimated residuals for inpatient and outpatient output are 
examined for distinct patterns of heteroscedasticity. As Figure 8 and Figure 9 display, the plots do not 
indicate the typical patterns of heteroscedasticity Consequently, the ordinary least squares (OLS) condition 
ofhomoscedasticity or the constant variance assumption is assumed to hold. 
Concerns of Autocorrelation Autocorrelation is more likely to be present in the regressions 
because the research deals with time-series data. Autocorrelation violates basic OLS assumptions for 
arriving at best linear unbiased estimators (BLUE) through correlation between members of a series of 
observations ordered in time. In this research, examination of the Durbin-Watson ,I statistic ofOLS residuals 
indicated the error tetm for the time series data in the cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness regressions are 
at least first-order autoregressive in nature; hence, it is necessary to consider alternative regression 
techniques so that the impact of autocorrelation can be minimized in estimating regression parameters. 
Concerns of Specification Errors Another basic assumption of classical regression analysis is 
that the regression equations used are correctly specified. The specification of the service utilization and 
quality of care functions are largely guided by theoretical and empirical assumptions. It is assumed here that 
public mental health care output is predominantly affected by expenditure and demand for such care, as well 
as the presence of managed care refonn acfr,ities. The possibility of making specification errors are 
examined for the fitted equations after the correction for autocorrelations using two alternatives: the Durbin-
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closer to one the R-square statistics are, the better the goodness-of-fit and the fewer specification errors of 
the service utilization and quality of care functions. Table 3 below lists these d statistics and R-square 
statistics. All results but the outpatient determination coefficient (R-square) do not suggest severe 
specification errors. 
With due consideration, it appears that autocorrelation is the only problem in the data sets of the 
research that could lead to a violation in the basic assumptions for arriving at estimators with the desired 
properties of classical normal linear regression. Therefore, this research will employ the autoregression 
(AR/SAS®) procedure in fitting data to the equations in order to minimize the impact of autocorrelation on 
Table 3: Durbin-Watson d Statistics and R-square Statistics for Detecting Specification Errors 
Regressions R-square 
: Out atient utilization 1.9669 0.3356 
f Inpatient utilization 
I -
1 1.8219 ! 0.9590 
Cost-effectiveness measured b · 30-da recidivism I 2.0230 0.8833 
' Cost-effectiveness measured b 60-da recidivism 1.9550 i 0.9076 
Cost-effectiveness measured by 90-dav recidivism 1.9593 0.9264 
the quality of the estimators. Also, in these autoregressions. maximum likelihood computation is employed in 
the regressions with autoregressive (AR) schemes. The use of maximum likelihood estimation would 
minimize the sum of squares and maximize the log likelihood, respectively. Also, relevant optimization is 
performed simultaneously for both the regression and AR parameters. 
===♦==~ 
This chapter defined terms and definitions of efficiency and effectiveness measurement. Cost-
efficiency and cost-effectiveness are evaluated from five basic measures: (I) program expenditure per 
member per month ($PMPM); (2) program expenditure per user per month ($PUPM); (3) program 
expenditure per outpatient session; ( 4) program expenditure per inpatient bed-day; ( 5) reduction in 
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recidivism rates per $1,000 program expenditures. Program expenditures, adjusted for inflation in medical 
care services, were considered as the base of the cost analysis. 
A brief discussion was made about using recidivism rates (30-day, 60-day, and 90-day) as quality 
indicators. This researcher believes that recidivism rates can be used to measure the effectiveness of 
integration and coordination of inpatient and outpatient care, especially when such interactions are 
promotional goals of a system of care. The chapter justified the validity of using recidivism rates under a 
managed care system, while stating that the likelihood of readmission rates being skewed by the practice of 
prior authorization was small. 
Data used in this research covered a series of longitudinal, financial, and utilization information for 
Tennessee· s public mental health care system from January 1994 to December 1998. The first 30 months of 
data were associated with the FFS system under administration of the TDMHMR. The remaining 30 months 
of data were associated with the capitation system administrated by the TPP. All data were aggregated 
monthly. 
The chapter also discussed specifics about regression and testing techniques used in this research. 
Cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness analyses were based on estimations of multi-variable, linear 
regressions of service utilization and quality of care. For inpatient and outpatient utilization functions, the 
volume of service utilization measures (IPDA YS, OPSVCS) were assumed to depend on program funding 
(IPFl.Th.'D, OPFUND), population of consumers in care (IPSVD, OPSVD), and whether or not utilization 
was impacted by managed mental health care refonn. For quality of care functions, rates on 30-day, 60-day, 
and 90-day readmissions per 1,000 members were assumed to depend on program funding per 1,000 
members, total program users per 1,000 members, and whether a system was under managed care. 
These regressions were used to test two hypotheses of various fonns of cost-efficiency and cost-
effectiveness measures using an econometric methodology of testing structural changes using Chow test: ( 1) 
the parameters of the inpatient and outpatient utilization functions given by the capitation-based managed 
mental health care system (TPP) will not be different from the parameters of the utilization regressions given 
by the fee-for-service mental health care system (TDMHMR); (2) the parameters of the quality of care 
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regressions given by the capitation-based managed mental health care system (TPP) will not be different 
from the parameters of the quality of care regressions given by the fee-for-service mental health care system 
(TDMHMR). 
Several typical concerns in classical nonnal linear regressions were investigated. Only 
aotucorrelation, which could lead to a violation in basic assumptions for arriving at estimators with the 
desired properties concerning behavior of regression disturbances in the classical regressions, was indicated. 
Therefore, this research employed the Autoregression (AutoReg/SAS®) procedure along with maximum 
likelihood estimation in fitting data to equations in order to minimize the impact of autocorrelation on 
desired qualities of the parameters of the estimations. 
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Chapter 3: Analysis of Cost-Efficiency and Cost-Effectiveness 
Chapter three presents cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness analyses in the areas of program 
access, inpatient care, outpatient care, and quality of care. Actual TPP expenditures are compared to 
projected expenditures as if there were no changes made to the system to quantify the overall cost 
containment effort. Average and marginal utilization costs are estimated. Costs of access to care in per 
member per month and per user per month are evaluated also. Further observations are made regarding 
strategic factors of managed care, such as service substitution, contracting, and service system 
reconfiguration. 
3.1 Program Funding Trend and Cost-Efficiency of Access to Care 
State expenditures 46 (Table 4) on public mental health care services increased progressively 
throughout the TDMHMR and the TPP periods. Significant increases in Tennessee's public mental health 
expenditures were concentrated in the outpatient sector. Outpatient expenditures increased from about $25 
million in fiscal year 1987-88 to about $56 million in fiscal year 1989-90, then to $147 million in fiscal year 
1995-96, averaging about a 27.6 percent annual rate of increase over eight years during the TDMHMR 
administration. Funding in inpatient care had a relatively small change for the same period, from $87 million 
in fiscal year 1987-88 to $104 million in fiscal year I 995-96, averaging about a 2. 7 percent increase. The 
disproportionate distribution between inpatient and outpatient sectors was the result of a long-term national 
FY 1987-88: State Suhmission lo NIMH, lmplcmt-"Iltation Status Report (reYised). May 1993, p. 19 
FY 1988-89: State Submission to NIMH. Implementation Status Report (=ised). May 1993, p. 19 
FYl989-90: Tenncsst--c lmpkmenllltion Status Report, Adult. July I, 1992-June 30, 1993, p. 23 
FYI 990-91: Tennessee Implementation Status Report, Adult. July I, 1992-June 30, 1993, p 23 
FY 1991-92: Tennessee lmplemenlation Status Report, Adult. July I, 1992-June 30, 1993, p. 23 
FY1992-93: Tennessee Implementation Status Rt--port, Adult. July I, 1992-.lunc 30, 1993, p. 23 
FY 1993-94: Annual Plan for a Comprehensi,·e System of Mental Health SerYicl--s in Tcnnesst-'C, Adult, July I, 1994 • June 30, I 995. 
p. 53 
FYl994-95: 1995 Annual Report, Breakthrough, TI)MHMR. vol. 21, No. I, p5 
FY 1995-%: TI)MHMR CMHCs and RMHls cost reports 
FY 1996-97: TennCare Partners Program Monthly Capitation l'a~111cnt Reports and Encounter Estimates 
FY 1997-98: TL'TlnCarc l'urtncrs l'rog,rnm MnnthlY Capitation Pa,·mcnt Reports and Encounter F.stimatcs 
FY 1998-99: TcnnCarc Partners Program Monthly Capitation Payment Reports and Encounter Estimates 
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Table 4: Tenncs!ltt's Public Mental Health Program Expl'llditun:s 

































All Expenditures arc Medical Care Scniccs Components of Consumer Price Indices adjusted {19R2-1984=100). 
strategic emphasis on community-based care and deinstitutionalization. Together, inpatient and outpatient. 
the average annual rate of increase from fiscal year 1987-88 to fiscal year 1995-96 is about I 0. 7 percent, 
from $112 million to $25 I million (Table 4 ). 
The first three years of the TPP expenditures are also shown in Table 4. The total annual TPP 
expenditures, after IO percent administrative cost, were apportioned into pharmaceutical, inpatient, and 
outpatient sectors. With the knowledge of encounter-based inpatient and pharmacy costs, outpatient 
expenditures were estimated as the balance of total annual TPP expenditures less inpatient and pharmacy 
costs. Because TDMHMR program expenditures do not include pharmacy expenditures 47 , the comparable 
equivalents of the TPP expenditures in this analysis comprise expenditures only in inpatient and outpatient 
care. The first three years of the TPP expenditures and the last year of the TDMHMR expenditures are 
shown in Figure I 0. The second year drop in the TPP program expenditures has much to do with 
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unanticipated but significant increases m 
behavioral pharmacy costs. Pharmacy costs 
were not initially anticipated and appropriately 
budget in total TPP expenditures because cost 
estimates of the TennCare Mental Health and 
Substance Abuse Waiver were developed 
according to the TDMHMR fiscal year 1995-96 
(Waiver baseline year) expenditures which were 
spending projections in the Master Plan48 
Consequently, with fixed revenues and an 
unforeseeable magnitude of pharmaceutical 
spending, the BHOs would have taken away 
funding that could have been made available for 










FY 1 995- FY 1996- FY 1997 - FY 1998-
96 97 98 99 
TennCare MH/SA 
Wah·cr Baseline Year 
Figure IO: TPP Expenditures (Inpatient and Outpatient 
Care) Compared lo the Last Y"ar Expt,nditur" 
of the TDMHMR Operations 
(constant dollars, S million) 
dip into their reserve to pay for phamiacy costs. Therefore, at an extreme, the excessive spending in 
prescription drugs ,vould erode BHO profitability had there been any sa'vings from other types of care. In 
fact, by the middle of fiscal year 1997-98, pharmacy spending became so significant49 that not only the 
expenditures on inpatient and outpatient care took a deep plunge, but it hindered BHO profitability. In fact, 
one of the BHOs reported negative profits in the second year of the TPP operation. The financial pressure 
on the BHOs became so intense that it led eventually to the state decision to oversee the management and 
financial responsibility of the TPP's pharmaceutical care beginning in the third year of the TPP operation . 
. ,• D,rring the TDMI IMR period. prescription drugs were reimbursed directlv fr,>m the Mcdicaid/fcnnCare budget. They \H're not 
captured by the lDMHMR Direct Patient SerYiccs (DPS) claims information system. 
48 A task force report in 1998 by the state acknowk-dged new drugs are available now that were not available at the time the Master Plan 
was dew loped. The costs of all of these dmgs has not been factored appropriately into e-.pcnditurc projections . 
.,., It is recognized that a complex of factors attributed to such an increase, including price hikes, dispense vo!U111c per prescription 
increases, more prescriptions \\Titten, more p<.'()p]e using hch11\ioml drugs, more expensive drugs, non-mental health usage ofbch,l\ioral 
drugs, etc. As a result, bcha,ioral prescription costs, in curm1t dollars, increased from S 1.45 PMPM in July 1996 to $5 in June 1997 
during the first year 0f the TPP operation. The trend continued dtrring the second year of the TPP op<.·rntion. By the end of fiscal year 
1997-98, bcha,iornl prt·scription costs reached $8.22 PMl'M. Owr a 30-month period, the awragc rate of hchmioral phannacy cost 
increase in l'Ml'M is roughly eight percent. (MC<) crosso,·cr hehaYioral prescription claims contribute 1,, ahoul 20-30 ]X"TCcnt of the 
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Figure l l depicts the distribution trends of the TDMHMR and the TPP expenditures over a l 2-year period. 
Two significant turning points in recent years are worth mentioning. One, for the first time in Tennessee's 
history of public mental health care, during the development and implementation of the TDMHMR Master 
Plan since fiscal year 1989-90, spending on the outpatient sector increased significantly, eventually 
outweighing spending on inpatient care. Two, under managed care reform, spending on inpatient care began 
to decrease dramatically. 
The course of the first three years of the TPP spending, shown as the continuation of and the 
trending of the TDMHMR program's spending, is depicted in Figure 12. The downward departure of the 
actual TPP program expenditures from the linear trend of the TDMHMR expenditures indicates that the 
growth momentum of program expenditures abated. The linear trend based on the TDMHMR's past 
experience of program spending predicted that fiscal year I 996-97, 1997-98 and 1998-99 public 
expenditures would be about $263, $282 and $300 million, respectively. The actual spending of the TPP 
-+-op Expenditures ___ ,P Expenditures 
S250,000,000.00 · ··· 
FY1987- FY198S- FY1989- FY1990- FY1991- FY1992- FY1993- FY1994- FY199> FY1996- FY1997- FY199S-
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 98 99 
flgutt J J: Impact of the MaAter Plan and Managed-c:are Reform 
(current dollan) 
total ,olumc of prescription claims. Ah.ml RO percent of crossm·cr bchu,ioral pharmacy recipients had nc\"er usl.-d any Sl."T\ices from the 
56 
--Actual TPP Expenclilure -Projecled TPP Expendilure 
FY19a7- FY111118-FY11N19- FY1~ FY1881· FY1992· FY11183- FY198,4. FY199S- FY1996- FY19117- FY19Q&-
~ § ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ w ~ ~ 
Flpre 12: Demonstnttion of the TPP Proaram1• Short-term Cost Containment 
(con1tant dollan) 
program was about $269, $236 and $259 million (Table 4), averaging a nine percent annual savings. 
Consistent with most literature, short-term spending momentum of the public mental health program 
expenditures was contained in growth rates and magnitude during the first three years of managed care 
reform. Still, long-term sustainability of such abatement is yet to be seen. 
As important as the primary objective of cost containment was. managed care reform in 
Tennessee's public health care system was called upon to broaden health care access as well, especially for 
uninsured and uninsurable Tennesseans. Since the TPP propram was designed to be the partner of the 
TennCare program, about 1.2 million TennCare enrollees (approximately 800,000 Medicaid/Medicare 
consumers and about 400,000 uninsured and uninsurable) were automatically covered by the TPP program 
under designed mental health benefits starting July 1, 1996. In terms of nominal access or members covered 
BHO p1miw..-rs.) (rl.'flllCarc. (64)). 
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by the TDMHMR and TPP programs, defined as the population that had open census records or open 
eligibility records during each measuring period in either the TDMHMR system or the TPP system, it is 
indisputable that the state has fulfilled its goal of expanding mental health care access. The nominal access to 
the TDMHMR system was about 85,000 individuals in January 1994, and was about 113,000 individuals in 
June 1996. These compare to about 1.2 million enrollees in July 1996 and 1.3 million enrollees in December 
1998 in the TPP period. The accessibility was also measured by positive access or program users in the 
TDMHMR system and the TPP system, defined as unique consumers who actually used mental health 
services during the measuring periods. Unlike nominal access, the TPP system had a sustained period of 
about a two-year span during which the levels of positive access were actually lower when compared to the 
positive access formed under the TDMHMR system during fiscal year 1995-96, indicating a possibility of 
restricting consumers' access to care. It was not until fiscal year 1998-99 that the number of users matched 
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Program expenditures are measured by cost per member per month (PMPM) and cost per user per 
month (PUPM). Because of dramatic increases in size of population, PMPM cost in the TPP system was 
much lower than that in the TDMHMR system, averaging about $196 PMPM during the TDt-.1HMR period 
to $16 PMPM during the TPP period (Figure 14 ). However, program user-based costs were more 
comparable across the two study periods. Also demonstrated in Figure 14, start-up costs in PUPM in the 
TPP system were actually much higher than the TDMHMR' s cost in $PUPM in fiscal year 1995-96. Such an 
outcome was mainly the result of restricted positive access50 at the beginning of the TPP program. In 
general, program user costs (PUPM) have been decreasing progressively within both periods. In 30-month 
average terms, PUPM cost in the TPP system ($477) is statistically significantly lower than PUPM cost 
($658) in the TDMHMR system, at a 95 percent confidence interval. However, if the TPP PUPM is 
compared to the average PUPM cost m the Waiver baseline year, the rates are the same ($477). 
Regardless, the underlying reasons for both systems' achieving reductions in per user costs during 
$PMPM SPUPM 
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~, The user population is estimated using paid claims/encounter Tl'l:ords on!~. V-.'hm denied claims \\c'Te included. there were additi,mal 
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the two study periods are quite different. For the TDMHMR system, particularly in its last year of operation, 
a reduction in per user costs was realized by stimulating positive access to care, namely, by serving more 
people in the system each month (Figure 15). The TDMHMR user population increased from about 24,000 
users in June 1995 to 42,500 users in June 1996 (a 77 percent increase in a 12-month period). As a 
consequence, relative frequencies of outpatient services per user and program user cost (PUPM) decreased 
during the TDMHMR period. For the TPP period, the reduction in cost PUPM was primarily the result of 
limited program spending on inpatient and outpatient care, also demonstrated in Figure 15. 
Unfortunately, the accomplishment of the TPP's cost containment efforts was overshadowed by the 
TPP's skyrocketing spending on behavioral drugs during the TPP study period. Although magnitude was not 

















care into the pharmaceutical sector. According to a BHO pharmacy stud/ 1 (TennCare, l 999 [64]), from 
July 1996 to December 1998, behavioral pharmacy spending, including MCO crossovers~2, increased from 
$1.75 million per month to $12.4 million per month (a 609 percent increase), and the prescription user costs 
increased from $1.45 per member per month to $9.62 per member per month (a 563 percent increase). 
Among leading contributing factors, the increase in number of prescriptions per user per month was 
significant. There was a 50 percent increase among the SPMI/SED population during the TPP period, from 
about two prescriptions per patient per month in July 1996 to about four prescriptions per patient per month 
in December 1998. The number of prescriptions per month used by the non-SPMI/SED population increased 
from about one prescription per patient per month in July 1996 to about two prescriptions per patient per 
month in December 1998. In terms of cost, the SPMI/SED population generally used more expensive 
prescriptions than others, increasing from $27.95 per patient per month in July 1996 to $41.91 per patient 
per month in December 1998 
3.2 Cost-Efficiency--Inpatient Care 
This section investigates cost-efficiency of the managed care program in the inpatient sector. 
Patterns of hospital utilization, bed-days, are evaluated according to the overall changes in healthcare 
system, policy, expenditure, and demand for inpatient care. Cost-efficiencies in the TDMHMR period are 
used as baseline measures in making comparisons. 
Institutional or hospital-based inpatient utilization has long been targeted for health and mental 
health care cost reduction primarily because of its dominant share in health care spending and restrictive 
treatment settings. As shown in Table 4, in fiscal year 1987-88 about 77 percent of Tennessee's public 
mental health care spending was spent on mental health institutes and psychiatric facilities. Efforts at 
deinstitutionalization date back to the 1960s. Since the early 1960s, national strategy on public mental health 
care began to shift from institutionally focused mental health care systems toward community-based care. 
' 1 Lead h, this researcher 
'' All hel;a,·ioral health care related drug.s prescribed hy MCO prmidcrs, regardless ol'\\hcthcr the purp,.,se ol'lhe prnseriptions \\as 1,, 
treat medical cond1t1ons or m,:ntal health conditions, \\CTC paid as hehmiowl health pham1ae\' expenditures. 
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The decision in expanding community-based care in the early days was primarily compelled by the concern 
for appropriateness of care, rather than cost containment. From a medical perspective, community-based 
care was considered as more desirable than institutional approaches because it could offer care in less 
restrictive, community-like environments. Funding balances resulting from deinstitutionalization were simply 
transferred to expand systems of community-based care. 
Significant redistribution between inpatient and outpatient care came in the early 1990s when cost 
reduction in inpatient care became a major concern in mental health strategic planning. About the same time 
many states were conducting managed care-like experiments in the public mental health care arena, 
Tennessee developed and implemented the Master Plan in the early 1990s (TDMHMR, 1994 [59]). The 
most significant contribution of the Master Plan to the development of Tennessee's public mental health care 
system was that for the first time in the history of Tennessee's public mental health care, the weights of 
outpatient and inpatient expenditures became reversed. During the first three years of development and 
implementation of the Master Plan, the expenditure on outpatient care began to outweigh expenditure on 
inpatient care as a result of systematic discharges of residence patients from institutions into community 
care. Figure 16 depicts the progress of this proportional redistribution. As the figure indicates, the 
redistribution effects were reinforced after managed mental health care reform, after fiscal year I 996-97. 
Overall, in an eight-year time span, the proportional distribution between inpatient and outpatient care 
completely reversed. Expenditures in institutional care dropped from approximately 77 percent in fiscal year 
1987-88 to approximately 24 percent in fiscal year 1998-99, while community care increased from about 23 
percent in fiscal year 1997-88 to about 76 percent in fiscal year 1998-99. 
The next significant milestone set by managed care reform m reshaping the landscape of 
Tennessee's public mental health care came 'with a significant reduction in inpatient spending. Fibrure 17 
depicts the trends of aggregated cost and utilization statistics for the study periods. From a utilization 
perspective, bed-days decreased significantly during the TPP period. Over a 30-month period, the number 
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to be the result of restricting access to inpatient care because the numbers of monthly patient census (users) 
and admissions in the TPP period were much higher than they were in the TDMHMR system, as depicted by 
Figure 18. 
Figure 18 displays the trends of the TDMHMR's and the TPP's monthly admission and patient 
censuses, reviewing the distinct performance patterns of the two systems. The trends of admission and 
patient censuses in the TDMHMR system were fairly stable, characterized by small but stable admissions and 
a large population of resident patients, indicating that the system was oriented toward providing long-term 
mental health care. On the other hand, the TPP inpatient system, being a newly started system, had relatively 
volatile performance paths as regards both the admission and the patient censuses. Distinctively, the TPP's 
inpatient system had reversed the order of the admission and the patient censuses: the admission census 
began to surpass the patient census indicating a strategic shifting from long-term inpatient care to acute 
(short-term) inpatient care. Consequently, average length of stay per patient had decreased from around I 9 
days in the TDMHMR system to I I days with the TPP system. 
3500 ... ,,.~--~· ......... ,,, .. ,,. ~...... ._.,...  , . .,, , .... ...,y . ...,, •• ,.__., • ~ ,· ···•,;, .,.,..,. •••• ,., 
2500 
-+-Admi5Sions ...... IP Census 
a smaller gap between the inpatient 
monthly IP census and admission 
indicating frequently discharges and 
short-term stays: Average Length of 
Stay • 11 days 
Figure 18: Trend1 of Adml11ion and Resident Patient Census 
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Expenditures on inpatient care decreased significantly as well after managed care reform, shown 
also by Figure 17. The relative cost-efficiency of inpatient care between the two systems is quantified by the 
following forms of the inpatient utilization function: 
The restricted form of the function is: 
[ IPDAYS 11 ] = [i,1 
ll'DAYS 12 0 
0 /PFUND 11 
/PFUND ,2 I a,1 I IPSVD 11 l a, 2 IPSVD 12 /J1PFC.\'D + µ 
/3/PSl'D 
The unrestricted form of the function is: 
I IP/JAYS ti 7 = 1;,1 




i, 2 /PFUND 12 
0 
ll'Sl1J 
r a, 1 1 ll /J ll'FC\'D .II 
J·r /J /l'Sl'D ,r I !. + II r2 a t2 I 
p /PF/_;_\'[) ·' 2 l 
p /!'SID .12 j 
\Vhere /PFUND represents monthly public program expenditures on inpatient care; IPSf'D represents 
monthly patients served or user census in inpatient care; 11 is the time indices for the TDMHrvfR period, and 
12 is the time indices for the TPP period. 
The specific null hypothesis of no structural change is formulated as, the utilization parameters in 
the TDMHMR period and the TPP period have not changed despite of the present of managed care reform. 
Ho : a,1 = a,2; PIPFL'.\'D.11 = PIPFD'lJ.12; Pm~rv.,1 = PIP.~1v.,2 
H" : fl O is not true. 
Table 5 presents SAS® Auto-Regression output. Because the calculated Chow test statistic of 
12.71 is greater than the critical value of 2.76 (a= 0.05), the null hypothesis of no structural change in 
regression coefficients is rejected at a five percent level of significance. Based on these results, it is 
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Table 5: Summary of SAS~ Output and Chow Test Statistics - Inpatient Care 
(AUTOREG, AR=l, ML) 
Intercept IPFUND IPSVD Total-Rsqr SSE 
TDMHMR -931.0357 0.003202 3.6011 0.8772 6040862.82 
t -0.34 14.55 2.24 
p (0.7353) (<.0001) (0.0335) 
TPP -1405 0.001886 5.7616 0.9014 65373854.2 
t -0.27 5.98 2.44 
p (0.7892) (< .0001) (0.0217) 
TDMHMR& TPP 12973 0.00251 -1.7437 0.9122 121830979 
I t 4.85 9.76 -1.44 
i p ! (< .0001) (< .0001) I (0.1556) I 




8/PIJA y5,· ,., ,., . . 
/311,Fc,mmm\lR= al PFUND= 3 __ Q_ days per $1,000 expenditure, or $312.31 per diem. 
TPP period: 
o!PDAYS 
/Jm-nv TPP = = 1.886 days per $1,000 expenditure, or $530.22 per diem . 
.. · o!PFUND 
Averal!e: 
TDMHMR period (JO-month average)= $262.27 per diem. 
Waiver Baseline-Year (12-month average)= $275.60 per diem. 
TPP period (30-month average)= $274.51 per diem. 
7he 71'P average per diem rate is statistically sig11ific:a11Jly different.from Jhe 7DA1HMR ai•erage per 
diem rate in the TDMHMR 30-month period, hut not slatistically sig11ifica11Jly different from the average per 
diem rate in lhe Waiver Baseline period, at a 95% c:011.fide11ce interval. 
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concluded that the utilization function of Tennessee's public mental health inpatient care has experienced 
structural change since managed care reform. Hence, system parameters such as levels of program funding 
and program users in the TPP period did not affect inpatient utilization in the same way as they did in the 
TDMHMR period. 
Typically, the TDMHMR form of the inpatient utilization function and the TPP form of the 
inpatient utilization function are quantified as: 
TDMHMR: IPDAYS\ 1 = -931.0357 + 0.003202/PFUND, 1 +3.601 lf PSVD 11 + e,1 , 
(-0.34) (14.55) (2.24) 
TPP: ll'DAYS, 2 =-1405+0.001886/PFUND, 2 +5.7616/PSVD, 2 +e, 2 
(-0.27) (5.98) (2.44) 
The partial coefficients of inpatient funding (IPFUND) indicate that, at the margin, per $1,000 TPP 
inpatient incremental expenditures would yield about two bed-days, while per $1,000 TDMHMR inpatient 
incremental expenditures would yield about three bed-days. In other words, the marginal inpatient program 
expenditure per inpatient day for the TPP period was about $530, and the marginal program expenditure per 
inpatient day in the TDMHMR period was about $312. Therefore, a day of inpatient care required more 
program funding in the TPP/capitation program during July 1996 to December 1998 than in the 
TDMHMR/FFS program during January 1994 to June 1996. Notice that the above conclusion of cost-
efficiency was evaluated from the perspective of the program funding, not from the perspective of true 
production costs. In order to compare the true production costs per diem across the two periods, one would 
need to know what kinds of inputs were included in a typical day of inpatient care, such as staff time and 
skills, equipment and suppliers, etc. Because these factors were not known to this researcher, it would not 
be conclusive that if the actual cost per diem in the TPP period was comparable or not comparable to the 
actual cost per diem in the TDMHMR period. 
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Average cost estimates per diem were also listed in Table 5. Overall. the 30-month average cost per 
diem for the TPP system was $274.51 which was significantly higher than the 30-month average cost per 
diem, $262.27, for the TDMHMR system. When compared to the average cost per diem in the Waiver 
baseline period, $275.60. the TPP rate was low but not statistically significant. Over a 30-month period. the 
TPP rate displayed a fairly stable trend (Figure. 19). 
The fact that inpatient spending was down but marginal expenditure was up for the TPP period 
could be an indication that during the first 30 months of its journey the TPP system was able to achieve 
inpatient savings mainly through a substantial volume reduction in inpatient bed-days, not through 
improvement in cost-efficiency. Athough, within the managed care framework, there were indications that 
the BHOs could have reduced factor prices of inpatient care through contracting and redirecting significant 
amounts of utilization to where factor prices were lower. In fact, a separate analysis53 indicated that during 
~m-----~-' ....... _-~,_-~..,.....__,_...._-'--......,.--,-'-;.-:.-.,.---,..c.~'-'-,-.....,.~-,.,_--_,_.-~ 
~.,.~~.,. cfl'''~lj"' .;:"~:;~~✓~ ~;y'•jlj"cfl~~ _,,~/ i':,"' -l'"'~J" ~~"'cfl".,"'/ 
Flpare 19: Trend or Per Diem Rate (FY 1995-'6 - FY 1998-'9) 
~3 1bc TPP's encounter csti11U1tes, compiled hy this rcse11Tchcr. 
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the TPP period, about 45 percent of the inpatient days were directed toward private facilities where, on 
average, the estimated per diem rate was 5 percent below that of the RMHis. 
3.3 Cost-Efficiency--Outpatient Care 
The purpose of this section is to compare cost-efficiencies of the TPP's outpatient delivery system 
with the cost-efficiencies of the TDMHMR's outpatient delivery system. To accomplish this, all services 
and program users are first aggregated on a monthly basis from January 1994 to December 1999. The 
observed cost-efficiencies of the outpatient delivery systems are then measured and evaluated by unit costs 
of services in marginal and average terms. In formulating the comparisons, the parameters of the two 
systems are hypothesized not to be different despite structural changes in business and management 
strategies This hypothesis is tested with a two-variable linear regression using the Chow test. The fonns of 
the outpatient utilization functions are: 
The restricted form of the function: 
all 
[ OPSVCS ti l = [;" 0 OPFl/ND II Ol'SVD 11 ] a,2 
i, 2 OPFUND ,2 OPSVD 12 PorFr.-xn OPSVCS ,iJ 0 
Pol'SID 
,The unrestricted form of the function: 
0 0 
[OP5,'VC5,' 11 ] = [;II 








O ] P0Ps1v.,1 + u 




In these equations, OPFUND represents monthly public program expenditures on outpatient care; 
OPSJ'D represents monthly patients served or user census in outpatient care; ti is the time indices for the 
TDMHMR period, and t2 is the time indices for the TPP period. 
The null hypothesis is formed that the parameters of the TPP form of the outpatient delivery 
function are the same as for the TDMHMR form of the outpatient delivery function: 
Ho : a,1 = a,2; /Jonr.vD.11 = /JoPFcxn.,2; /Jopsm.11 = f3ops1-v.,2 
H O : H0 is not true. 
As was discussed in chapter two, the regression data are time series in nature and possess 
autocorrelation problems. Therefore, an Autoregressive procedure (AutoReg/SAS®) was used in parameter 
estimations. Table 6 presents the results of the analysis. A Chow test statistic was calculated based on 
regression output. Since the calculated F value 35.70 is greater than the critical value 2.76, the null 
hypothesis that the parameters of the TDMHMR's outpatient delivery function are the same as the 
parameters of the TPP' s outpatient delivery function is rejected at a 95 percent confidence interval. 
The TDMHMR form of the outpatient utilization function and the TPP form of the outpatient 
utilization function are quantified as follows: 
TDMHMR: OPSVCS, 1 = 39960 + 0.01950PFUND, 1 -2.5196OPSVD, 1 + e,1, 
(8.3) (57.94) (-16. 18) 
TPP: OPSVCS, 2 = 71476-0.005882OPFUND, 2 + 4.1425OPSVD,2 + e,2. 
(3 68) (-3.39) (5.3) 
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Table 6: Summary of SAS~ Output and Chow Test Statistics - Outpatient Care 
(AUTOREG, AR=6, ML) 
Intercept OPFUND OPSVD Total-Rsqr SSE 
TDMHMR 39960 0.0195 -2.5196 0.9812 90733323.4 
I 8.3 57.94 -16.18 
p (< .0001) (< .0001) (< .0001) 
TPP 71476 -0.005882 4.1425 0.6302 3446456738 
t 3.68 -3.39 5.3 
p (0.0014) (0.0028) (< .0001) 
TDMHMR& TPP 124401 0.003409 0. 1662 0.3521 10553300000 
t 4.8 1.59 0.27 
p (< .0001) (O. l 185) (0 7907) 
I 





Pof'I-L\"LH1).lfll.\/R= iXJPFUND 19.5 services per $1,000, or $51.28 per unit of services. 
TPP period: 
iJOPSVC 
Pol'I-CVJ TPI' = = -5.88 services per $1,000, or -$170.01 per unit of services . 
. · 8/PFUND 
Averal!e: 
TDMHMR period (30-month average)= $63.62 per unit of services. 
Waiver Baseline-Year ( 12-month average)= $71.42 per unit of services. 
TPP period (30-month average)= $77.43 per unit of services. 
]he TPP average unit cost is statistically significantly differelll tha11 the average 1111it costs in the 
lDMHMR 30-molllh period and i11 the Wail'er Baseline period, at a 95 percent confidmce illlerval. 
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The sign of partial coefficient of the TPP outpatient funding (OPFUND) in the TPP outpatient 
utilization function indicates that under a "top-down"54 capitation arrangement, the relationship between 
program funding and output of outpatient services was no longer positive. In other words, more funding 
devoted in the outpatient care did not necessary induce more services (Figure 20). Therefore, from the 
perspective of outpatient program funding and outpatient services, the outpatient care in the first 30 months 
of the TPP program was not as efficient as the outpatient care in the last 30 months of the TDMHMR 
program. 
Average cost-efficiency estimates are also presented in Table 6. Overall, the average program 
expenditure per unit of outpatient services in the TPP system was about $77.43, which was statistically 
significantly higher than the average program expenditure per unit of outpatient services in the 30-month 
TDMHMR period ($63.62), and higher than the average unit cost in the Waiver baseline period ($71 .42) at 
a S percent level of significance. 
Theoretically and empirically, a negative correlation between program funding and volume of 
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"'A capitation payment arranger111.."llt is in place between not only the ll'P and the BHOs, but also hctween the Bl !Os and the prO\idcrs. 
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outpatient services under a capitation-based system should not come as a surprise as many have expressed 
concern about the possibility that a capitation program may restrict access and service utilization. The reason 
is fairly straightforward. Under a prepaid capitation arrangement, what directly matters to BHOs is the 
number of covered lives (members) which contribute to BHO revenues directly and positively if increased. 
Once the revenue is advanced, increases in the volume of services (visits or bed days) would reduce to 
profits, assuming other population actuarial characteristics and medical technologies stay unchanged, and 
quality of care was maintained. Therefore, under a capitation system the relationship between volume of 
services and levels of program expenditure may take various signs, especially when the measuring period is 
short. For the TPP outpatient system scrutinized here, an inverse relationship was found. 
The regression results also reviewed a negative correlation between population served and volume 
of services received under the TDMHMR system. Such an outcome could be largely attributed to the 
implementation of the Master Plan during the last few years of the TDMHMR administration. Because the 
community care system was making progress in reducing the frequency of patient services from about eight 
sessions per patient per month to three or four sessions per patient per month, the dramatic reduction in 
relative service frequencies should have led to not only a significant reduction in the volume of services, but 
also to reduction in CMHAs revenues. Rather, as demonstrated by Figure 21, the potential reduction in the 
volume of services was made up for by increases in the monthly patient census. In so doing, the revenue to 
the CMHAs was not affected. These opposing trends, the increase in clients and the decrease in claims, were 
underlying reasons for having a negative correlation between OPSVD and OPSVCS during the TDMHMR 
period. Monthly frequency of outpatient services per outpatient user were reduced about 50 percent in the 
TDMHMR period as a result of the implementation of the Master Plan, from about eight services per patient 
per month to four services per patient per month. During the TPP period, service frequency has been 
maintained at about three to four services per user per month (Figure 22). 
Utilization patterns have been reformatted strategically under the managed care program (Table 
7). Much emphasis in outpatient care was centered on management and stabilization of symptoms, rather 
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Table 7: Reconfiguration of Outpatient Service Utilization Patterns 
Service Volume for selected Jun-94 Jun-95 Jun-96 Jun-97 Jun-98 % Change of Jun-
Service/Treatment Categories in 98 Volume as 
Percentage of Total Unhs of Services Compared to Jun-
96 Volume 
CASE MANAGEMENT 15.71 18.8 18.07 18.13 22.33 +23.58% 
CRISIS INTERVENTION 0.04 0.02 0.05 1.5 1.35 +26.00% 
MEDICATION MANAGEMENT 7.5 8.15 9.95 10.64 11.79 +18.49% 
DAY TREATMENT 20.22 20.44 18.52 3.98 2.23 -87.96% 
PSYCHO REHABILITATION 8.14 7.94 8.5 0.39 0.39 -95.41% 
THERAPY 30.22 27.68 28.94 24.15 12.89 -55.45% 
OP SUBSTANCE DETOXIFICATION 1.42 0.38 0.25 0.04 0.01 -96.00% 
Source: TDMHMR and TPP claim/encounter data compiled b)· this researcher. 
TDMHMR system were no longer being used extensively under the TPP system (TDMHMR, 1997 [60]). 
Day treatment~~ services experienced the highest volume reduction. falling from about 20 percent of the total 
volume of services each month under the TDMHMR system to about two percent of the total volume of 
services each month in the TPP system. followed by therapy treatment and psychological rehabilitation-
related services (supported living. social skill development. and the like). Social support and rehabilitation 
types of services, such as supported employment, were also minimized in use. In the meantime, utilization of 
management and intervention types of services, such as case management, crisis intervention, and medication 
management, are reinforced over time under the managed care program. Such findings with the change in 
utilization patterns are consistent with findings from a TDMHMR survey (TDMHMR, 1997 [60]) assessing 
levels of services at the CMHAs three months after implementation of the TPP program. The result of the 
survey indicates that under the TPP program, day treatment services declined while crisis services and case 
management services increased. The survey also reports that there has been a decrease in non~MD 
outpatient services but an increase in outpatient MD services. 
The change of service utilization pattern would impact estimated unit service costs. If an average 
unit of services in the TPP period, as suggested, consisted of proportionally more costly services ( case 
management, crisis intervention, etc.) than it did in the TDMHMR period, then, it could result in a higher 
"Day Treutmcnt is a progrnm for patients who nL't.xl less than full time hospitalization but more intensiw and structured treatment than 
on an intcrrnillL'111 hourly basis. Basic Day Treatment components include Group ·1nernpy, Interpersonal Skill Training. Day l.i\lng 
Skills Training, Leisure Skills Training, Lducation Acti,itics. and Prc-V ocational Acti,ities (TDMHMR, I 993 I 63 j) 
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unit cost of setvices. In that case, the actual cost-efficiency of outpatient care in the TPP period could also 
be comparable to that given in the TPP period if the estimated average unit cost could be weighted and 
adjusted by the staff and technology intensities of the service components. 
Service substitutions between sectors may also be a contributing factor to the observed outcome of 
program inefficiency in the TPP's outpatient delivery system. As mentioned before, utilization of behavioral 
pharmacy services increased dramatically during the TPP period. Prescriptions increased from about two 
prescriptions per user per month to four prescriptions per user per month for the SPMI/SED population, and 
from about one prescription per user per month to two prescriptions per user per month for the non-
SPMI/SED population (TennCare. I 999 [64]). These changes could produce two effects. One is the 
reduction in frequencies of non-pharmacy service in outpatient and inpatient sectors. In all likelihood, 
patients who were put on regular or effective prescriptions would not have to use outpatient services as 
often as if they were not on such treatment routines. The second effect of such substitution is redistributing 
revenues and cost shifting from mental health service sectors, such as inpatient and outpatient care, to a 
pharmacy sector. If drug therapy could be used to reduce intensity of outpatient service utilization while 
revenues traditionally distributed into the outpatient sector were not adjusted accordingly, it would result in 
cost shifting from the outpatient sector to the pharmacy sector, and therefore, higher unit cost of program 
spending in the outpatient sector. 
Feldstein (Feldstein, 1999 [ I ! ], p. 25) presented some other scenarios on how inefficiencies or low 
productivity could occur when substitutions between different health care programs exist. He states that the 
input-output relationship for each health care program is not always independent of changes in scale in the 
other programs. ''For example, if one health program emphasizes prevention, then an increase in resources 
for this program is likely to affect the productivity of others, such as acute care services. These 
interrelationships between health programs may cause the input-output curve of particular programs to shift 
either to the left or to the right; that is, the marginal benefits of the affected program may be increased 
without changing expenditures for that program. In some cases, acute care programs may become more 
productive as, for example, after an increase in knowledge or technology (perhaps resulting from increased 
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expenditures on research programs). An increase in knowledge or technology may enable a provider to see 
more patients or to have a favorable effect on the outcome of the treatment provided. Alternatively, an 
increase in preventative programs may decrease the need for acute treatment in the population, thereby 
lowering the number of patients treated in existing acute care programs. The productivity of existing 
programs would therefore be lessened." 
Particular to this outpatient cost-effectiveness analysis, it also needs to be cautioned that the 
observed cost-efficiency of the TPP outpatient care system was arrived at under the assumption that the TPP 
program broke even financially. The result could be different from the actual cost-efficiency if the analysis 
was evaluated from the perspective of capitated providers of the BHOs. The key issue is that true profits and 
costs of outpatient care of these providers are not available for this study. Any savings or profits realized 
from outpatient care at the provider level would mean a reduction in the real unit cost of services. For 
example, if the providers were able to retain two percent of the revenue as profit, the actual unit cost of 
outpatient services would be about $71, which was the same as the unit cost given in the Waiver year. 56 If 
the providers were able to retain nine percent of the revenue as profit, the actual unit cost of outpatient 
services would be about $63, which \Vas the same as the unit cost given in the TDMHMR period 57 Any 
savings beyond nine percent of the capitated revenue at the provider level, would place the TPP program in 
a competitive advantage in real unit cost. Therefore, the actual cost-efficiency of the TPP outpatient care 
system is dependent on knowledge of the BHO profit level each month. 
jo The 2% profit is calculated by: 
2% = $12.200 .066 .44 -($71 * 166 .633), 
$ 19 .843 .342 .5 
whl.-rc, $12.200,066.44 is the 11'P"s monthly a\"crage outpatient expenditure alicr pharmacy cosL $71 multiplied by 166,633 units of 
sen-ices yields the expected outpatient cost if the BHO pro,iders produce with $71 as the unit cost: and $19,843,342.5 is the TPP"s 
a\"crage monthly expt.-nditure in total. 
"lbc 9% profit is calculated by: 
9% = S 12 .200 .066 .44 - ($ 63 • (66 .631 ) , 
$ 19 .843 .342 .5 
where, $12,200,066.44 is the TPP's monthly a\"erag.e outpatient cxpt.-nditurc alk-r pharmacy cost: $63 multiplied by 166,633 units of 
sen-ices yields the expected outpatient cost if the Bl ]0 pni,-idL,-s produce with $63 as the unit cost: and $19.843}42.5 is the "D'P"s 
a\'cragc monthly expenditure in total. 
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3.4 Cost-Effectiveness-Recidivism Rates 
The objective of this section is to measure quality of care of the two study periods and to quantify 
and determine how program expenditures contribute to quality of care outcomes under different healthcare 
reigns. For the TPP program, with definite reductions seen in average length of stay and in frequency of 
outpatient services per user per month, perhaps the greatest challenge imposed by such reductions is about 
the TPP's ability to assure quality of care. As many others have demonstrated, it is not a very difficult task 
for managed care programs to realize savings in the first few years of program implementation. A stronger 
testimony for the advocacy of managed care relies largely in the ability to maintain or even improve upon 
quality of care, in addition to the ability to demonstrate long-term cost advantages. From payor and 
consumer perspectives, quality outcomes of managed mental health care reform are as essential as the desire 
for less expensive premiums. If the reduction in medical spending was associated with a notable 
deterioration in quality of care, the significance of cost-containment would be lessened even though the 
trade-off between quantity of services and quality of care could be justified because marginal costs of care 
and marginal benefits of care were brought close together. Consequently, managed care companies will have 
to explore a production region where the restraint in volume of services imposes a minimal negative impact 
on quality of care, or to develop an alternate production system in which the increase or decrease in certain 
types of services would promote better quality of care. 
Readmissions rates are considered to be quality of care measures. Proportional to a population in 
consideration, it is assumed that the fewer the number of patients being readmitted to inpatient facilities, the 
better the quality of a system of care; or, the longer the discharged patients stay in the community, the better 
the quality of a system of care. Naturally, one would question if the BHOs' managed care strategies, such as 
utilization management and pre-authorizations, would restrict inpatient utilization, so that readmissions were 
affected as well. However, this concern is not supported by the data. As presented in section 3.3, the number 
of inpatient admissions has increased during the TPP period, from averaging about 300 admissions each 
month during the TDMHMR period to averaging 2,600 admissions each month in the 
TPP period. Therefore, there has been no evidence that admissions have been restricted during the TPP 
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period. Further, it is generally believed that a decision on the acceptance or rejection of a patient admission 
should be determined by medical necessities a patient presented rather than by ones' history of 
hospitalization; i.e., a system should not make it difficult for a patient to be admitted just because he was 
recently discharged. For these reasons, recidivism rates are considered as valid measurements here. 
Hospital readmissions per 1,000 members and hospital readmissions per 1,000 discharges 
(RCID30D, RCID60D, RCID90D) are plotted in Figure 23 and Figure 24. The two measures resemble the 
same pattern of outcomes at all measuring intervals. These figures demonstrate a pattern that the TPP 
system had lower recidivism rates compared to the TDMHMR system. Table 8 below compared the 
readmission rates between the TDMHMR and the TPP periods. All rates between the two systems are found 
to be statistically significantly different (p < 0.05). Therefore, in terms of relative levels of recidivism rates 
seen in the two study periods, the managed care system was able to maintain and improve quality of care 
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Figure 24: Comparison of Trends of RecidMsm Rates (Readmission per 1,000 Patients Dlseharged) 
Table 8: Comparison of 30-month Average Readmission Rates 
30 Days 60 Days 90 Days 
Recidivism Rates 
TDMHMR TPP TDMHMR TPP TDMHMR TPP 
Average Readmission per 
I 170.13 126.56 250.70 165.64 360.82 187.96 1,000 Discharged Patients I 
•1o Readmission as of Total 
17.0% 12.7% 25.1% 16.6% 36.1% 18.8% 
Discharged Patients 
Average Readmission per 
0.55 0.27 0.82 0.32 1.00 0.40 
1,000 Members 
Note: All rates between the IDMHMR nnd the TPP ~-riods are statistically significantly different (a = 0.05). 
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Similar readmission rates were found in Callahan and colleagues' evaluation of Massachusetts' 
Medicaid MH/SA managed care experiment [50]: 19.9 percent in fiscal year 1992 and 18.9 percent in fiscal 
year 1993 during which managed care experiment was sought. Fisher, et al. found in their research that 
between 1986 and 1989 the probability of readmission within 30 days was between 11 percent and 20 
percent; the probability of readmission within 60 days was between 16 percent and 26 percent. The 
probability of remaining outside a state facility for four years after discharge was about 50 percent (Fisher, et 
al. 1992 [61)). As presented in Table 8, there were about 13 percent of the TPP patients discharged who 
were likely to be readmitted within 30 days, as compared to 17 percent of the TDMHMR patients 
discharged. And about 17 percent of the TPP patients discharged were likely to be readmitted within 60 
days, as compared to 25 percent of the TDMHMR patients discharged. These rates seem to be within the 
range of probabilities indicated in Fisher's study. Although, the TPP rates appear to be at the lower end of 
the range, the TDMHMR rates appear to be at the high end of the range. 
In order to observe how quality of care measures respond to key system factors, particularly to 
levels of program expenditures, recidivism rates per 1,000 members (RCIDPT) are assumed to be linearly 
dependent on program funding per 1,000 members (FUNDPT) and on the number of program users per 
1,000 members (SVDPT). The impact of the public mental health reform effort on program effectiveness is 
embedded in the time series estimated by the equations and tested by the hypothesis of no structural change. 
The association between program cost and quality outcome will then be examined in a dynamic manner by 
measuring and comparing the funding coefficients of hospital recidivism rates, if significant structural 
changes are found. 
There are three outcome equations to test the equalities of the parameters of the TDMHMR system 
and the TPP system: 
RCID30P1; = ru + r2_,FUNDPT, + r_~_,SVDPT, + e,, 
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where y 2 is the partial coefficient of program funding with respect to recidivism rates, measuring the 
cost-effectiveness of the program, and t are indices of time series data. If January 199-1 < = t < ~" June 
1996, then data points are from the TDMHMR period, and if.July 1996 < = t < = December 1998, then data 
points are from the TPP period. 
The general form of the hypotheses of these regressions is: 
i e., the parameters of the quality of care functions for the TD11HMR system and for the TPP system have 
not changed despite structural change in the payment mechanism. 
H 11 : H O is not true. 
Autoregressive (AR) factors are selected accordingly for regressions to accommodate 
autocorrelation situations for the measurements. Table 9 and Table 10 present the output of the 
SAS AutoReg® procedures. Chow test statistics are calculated and presented m the last column of 
Table 9 based on regression results. According to the Chow tests with respect to 30-day, 60-day, 
and 90-day regessions, the hypotheses that the parameters of the TDMHMR form of the quality of 
care function and the TPP form of the quality of care functions have not changed could not be 
rejected. Therefore, the tests suggest that cost-effectiveness across the two systems is not different 
despite the changes in payment methodology, level of program funding, and health care 
strategies. 
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Table 9: Maximum Likelihood Estimates (Output A) 
Model Period DW P<DW Total Rsqr SSE CHOW TEST 
RCID30PT TDMHMR 2.029 0.4363 0.6776 0.16288885 0.27 
(AR= I) 
TPP 1.7424 0.1501 0.3559 0.03576765 
ALL 2.0335 0.4639 0.8868 0.20161564 
RCID60PT lDMHMR 1.9254 0.3205 0.6898 0.295739 1.21 
(AR= 2) 
TPP 2.2063 0.6758 0.2571 0.0616%21 
ALL 1.9481 0.3376 0.9106 0.38139425 
RCID90PT lDMHMR 1.9149 0.3123 0.7175 0.37771729 1.55 
(AR= 3) 
TPP 2.2672 0.7526 0.3231 0.06815967 
ALL I. 9503 0.3391 0.9289 0.48433061 
Table 10: Maximum Likelihood Estimates (Output B) 
Model I PERIOD 
I 





r, I I Y2 I r.~ I i i I ! Ip> I/ Ip> I/ Ip:· I/ ! 
I Rc1moPT 1DMIIMR I 0.1107 0.42 3.7876E-06 3.04 -0 000%2 -2.98 I 
I 
(AR= 1) I (0.6782 ) (0.0053) (0.0061) 
Tl'P I o.5455 3.51 L233E-07 o.oi -0.008205 -2.61 
. (0.0017) (0.9842) (0.0147) 
I 
ALL I 0.2446 10.87 3.1275E-06 7.68 -0.000946 -4.00 
(< .0001) (<.0001) (0.0002) 
RCIIX,Ol'T Tl)MHMR 0.1417 0.39 5.3365E-06 3 04 -0.001194 -2.42 
I (AR= 2) (0.6983) (0.0055) (0.0229) 
TPP 0.651 2.27 -0.000001 I -0.95 --0.00381 I -0.70 
I ( O.o318) (0.3531) (0.4880) 
ALL 0.2949 8.22 4.3674E-06 6.95 --0.0010332 -2.79 
(< .0001) (< .0001) (0.0072) 
RCID<JOPT TI)MHMR 0.1 0.23 6.8676£-06 3.29 -0.001425 -2.72 
(AR= 3) (0 8203) (0.0031) (0.0120) 
TPP 0.7798 1.97 -0.000026 -1.59 0.000954 0.15 
(0.0603) (0.1243) (0.8844) 
ALL CU303 8.46 5.4 l06E-06 7.61 -0001197 -2.77 
(< .0001) (< .0001) (0.0077) 
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Instead of levels of program funding and size of user population, what could have contributed to 
the improvement in quality of care in the TPP period were the particular services that received much 
emphasis under the managed care program. As indicated in the previous section, managed mental health care 
refonn has reformatted the service and treatment modalities of public mental health care. Case management, 
crisis intervention, and medication monitoring and management type of services received growing emphasis 
in utilization. 
Beyond efforts in case management and medication management, the BHOs also put great 
emphasis on pre- and post-hospitalization intervention. In one sense, there was significant emphasis on using 
mobile crisis intervention (MCI) to deal with acute or crisis mental health episodes. The important functions 
of the MCI are designed to assess each crisis situation, provide medical and psycho interventions on site if 
necessary, and make referrals for inpatient admission if the on-site interventions are deemed not effective. In 
another sense, the BHOs have aggressively pursued offering outpatient follow-up and case management 
services to each patient after hospital discharge. For example, during the study period of the TPP system, the 
seven-day hospital discharge follow-up rate increased from 43 percent in July 1996 to 77 percent in October 
1998. The 14-day hospital discharge follow-up rate increased from 4 7 percent to 82 percent during the same 
period. These combined efforts have made a significant difference in maintaining and promoting sustainable 
outcomes of quality of care. Evidently, this finding was supported by Fisher's observation that " ... large 
numbers of individuals with serious and persistent mental illness can be served in the community without 
developing a disproportionately large chronically readmitted population if a comprehensive array of services 
is made available to them [ 61]." 
-- •=== 
This chapter reviewed the funding history of Tennessee's public mental health care from fiscal 
year 1987-88 to 1998-99. It was concluded that the managed care program achieved the goal of cost 
containment by about nine percent during the first three years of implementation. In 30-month averages, 
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program member costs and user costs during the TPP period were also significantly lower than those during 
the TDl\!l1-U\1R period: $196 PMPM versus $16, and $658 PUPM versus $477 PUPM, respectively. 
However, the TPP PUPM cost was the same as the PUPM cost estimated in the Waiver baseline year (fiscal 
year 1995-96). 
This chapter also presented statistics demonstrating that access to care has been broadened 
under managed care. Total program users increased from an average of 32,355 individuals each 
month to 41,969 individuals each month, indicating the possibility that either more established 
patients were using regular care, or new patients gained access to care under the managed care 
program. 
Total inpatient expenditures experienced a sharp and persistent reduction immediately after 
managed care reform, from about $104 million in fiscal year 1995-96 to $6 l million in fiscal year 1998-99 
(constant dollars). Bed-days decreased to about 13,000 days from about 33,000 days during the TPP period. 
While monthly admissions increased significantly in the TPP period, the average monthly number of bed-
days per inpatient user decreased from around 19 days in the TDMtilvfR period to 11 days in the TPP 
period. 
The cost-efficiency estimates of inpatient care indicated that at the margin the TPP program was 
not as efficient ($530 per diem, or an output of two bed-days per $1,000 input of inpatient expenditures) as 
what was under the TDMHMR ($312 per diem, or output of three bed-days per $1,000 input of inpatient 
expenditures). Without demonstrating a comparative cost advantage at the margin, the study suggested the 
TPP system achieved savings in inpatient care in the study period mainly through volume reduction, rather 
than productivity improvement. 
In outpatient care, the TPP program did not demonstrate comparative cost advantages. The 
correlation between program funding and the volume of services was found to be negative during the 
first 30 months of the TPP program. Such a phenomenon is being considered as typical with a capitated 
system. It is cautioned that the conclusion could be different when true costs at the provider level were 
known. 
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As to quality of care, this chapter demonstrated that the managed care program has maintained and 
improved outcomes of quality of care measured by 30-, 60-, and 90-day recidivism rates. Further analysis 
concluded that changes in program expenditures did not affect quality of care outcomes differently across 
the two study periods; therefore, cost-effectiveness held unchanged across the two periods. Factors other 
than program expenditure attributing to quality of care outcomes were thought to be, though not tested, 
management and intervention types of services, which were greatly emphasized under the managed care 
program. 
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Chapter 4: Summary of Findings and Further Discussion 
Chapter four outlines findings obtained in this research. Policy relevance and implications 
associated with these findings will be discussed. Lastly, some research limitations are also discussed. 
4.1 Summary of Findings 
Consistent with much of the literature reviewed, the macro level results of managed public mental 
health care reform in the state of Tennessee are fairly positive. First and foremost, the reform program was 
able to meet the expectation of cost containment. The overall growth rate and funding magnitude of public 
expenditure on inpatient and outpatient mental health care were checked during the first two and one-half 
years of the TPP program. The comparable spending of the TPP program during its first three years of 
implementation, on average, was about nine percent below the projected level of that of the TD!v1HMR. 
Based on the linear trend of funding experience for the TDMHMR system, the expected public expenditures 
for fiscal years 1996-97, 1997-98, and 1998-99 would be about $263, $282, and $300 million, respectively. 
The actual spending of the TPP program was about $269, $236, and $259 million. Hence, the reformed 
program has demonstrated its ability at realizing immediate cost savings. 
Also consistent with the literature, the major source of cost savings for the reform program came 
from the inpatient sector. As demonstrated in Figure 10, actual spending on inpatient care decreased 
continuously and significantly since the first year of the TPP's implementation, down from about $ I 04 
million (FYl995-96) to $83 million (FYl996-97), to $66 million (FYI997-98), and then to $61 million 
(FY 1998-99). The reduction in inpatient utilization in the TPP program was not associated with a reduction 
in admissions, but solely to reduced hospital stays. Since admission rates were up while average length of 
stay was down, it indicates the BHOs have not aggressively 'managed' access to inpatient care or 
aggressively pursued the substitution of outpatient care on a patient by patient basis. Rather, the BHOs acted 
more aggressively in regulating the length of inpatient stay. Further, BHOs diverted a significant volume of 
inpatient utilization to contracted private facilities where stays were short and per diem rates were relatively 
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low. In this manner, the TPP program was able to reduce about 21 percent of the inpatient bed days and 
reduce the average length of inpatient stay from roughly 19 days in the TDMHMR system to roughly 11 
days in the TPP system, and reduce inpatient spending about SO percent by the end of the period. 
Second, despite the effort at cost containment, the TPP program also achieved the goal of 
expanding access to public mental health care. As summarized in Table 11 below, all levels of access have 
increased significantly under the managed care program. On the basis of monthly averages, the actual 
number of program users increased approximately 23 percent as a result of extending access to new 
consumers or offering more services to the established though not frequently served users. On an monthly 
basis, actual program users increased from about 44,000 users in FY 1995-96 to about 48,000 in FY 1998-
Table 11: Summary of Program Access 
J Type of Access ! TDMHMR 30-month I TPP 30-montb Change ! 
! I Average ! · Average 
! Covered Lives/Members 101,826 1,225,372 t I 103.4% 
Served Lives/Users 32,355 41,969 I t 22.9% I 
i 
I Inpatient Users 1,685 2,348 t 39.3% I 
I 
! 
I Outpatient Users 32,354 41,192 t 23.7% I 
I 
I I 
99,"' indicating that more consumers getting routine serv·ices and (or) more consumers previously not being 
served by the TDMHMR system were able to gain access through the TPP program. Overall, the significant 
reduction in service utilization under Tennessee's public managed care reform did not place a negative 
impact on consumers' access to public mental health care, both in inpatient and in outpatient care settings. 
Third, the managed care program demonstrated better outcomes using recidivism-based quality of 
care measures. The JO-day, 60-day, and 90-day readmission rates are summarized in Table 12. Further, the 
econometric testing indicated that program expenditures did not affect quality of care outcomes differently 
across the two study periods. Therefore, cost-effectiveness held unchanged across the two periods. Factors 
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Table 12: Changes in Hospital Readmission Rates 
Readmission Rate TDMHMR 30-monlh TPP 30-monlh Change 
Anrage Anrage 
30-Jay readmission per 1,000 members 0.6 0.3 ,j,50% 
30-duy readmission J'<,'T 1,000 patients discharged 170 127 ,l,26% 
60-day readmission per 1,000 members 0.8 0.4 ,I.so¾ 
60-day readmission per 1,000 patients discharged 251 166 ,j,343/o 
90-da~· readmission per 1,000 members 1.0 0.4 ,l,60% 
90-day readmission per 1,000 patients discharged 307 188 ,j, 39% 
other than program expenditure attributing to quality of care outcomes were thought to be, though not 
tested, management and intervention types of sen,ices which were greatly emphasized under the managed 
care program. 
Fourth, under the reform program. both inpatient and outpatient sectors experienced significant 
volume and intensity reductions in service. As summarized in Table 13, about seven percent of the 
TDMHMR outpatient services and 21 percent of the TDMHMR inpatient bed days were deemed as 
excessive because the study demonstrated that the standard for quality of care was upheld under the 
capitation system without these services. Obviously, without restricting consumer access, the only means 
Table 13: Changes in Service Utilization 
Service Utilization TDMHMR JO-month TPP JO-month Average Change 
Avera2e 
Outpatient Services 178,554 166,633 ,l,6.7% 
Frequency of Outpatient 5.5 4.0 ,l,27% 
Services per user 
Bed days 32,395 25,685 J, 20.7% 
Admissions 324 2,603 t 703% 
Average LOS 19 11 J, 42% 
"'The user counts for the TJ>P system were from the inpatient and outpatient ,fatahuscs only. Fiscal year I 99~-99 usc-r populution is an 
annualized nurnher based on statistics from the first six months of the year. 
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that the reform program could use to realize such reductions was to reduce the relative intensity of services; 
i.e., reduce length of inpatient stay per admission or frequency of outpatient services per user per month. As 
a result, the inpatient average length of stay was down from about 19 days in the TDMHMR period to about 
l l days in the TPP period; the frequency of outpatient visits was down from about eight units of services per 
person per month in the TDMHMR (FFS) system to about four units of services per person per month in the 
TPP (capitation) system. 
Fifth, on a per member and per user basis, the observed program funding efficiencies improved. As 
presented in Table 14, the capitation program holds distinct cost advantages in member cost ($PMPM) and 
user cost ($PUPM) as a direct result of restricted funding and increased access. Coincidentally, the PUPM 
cost in the TPP period was the same as the PUPM cost in the Waiver baseline period (fiscal year 1995-96). 
However, at the micro level, the TPP program has not demonstrated cost-efficiencies in traditional output 
measures (i.e., per diem rate and unit cost of outpatient services) in the period observed. Although it is 
cautioned that outpatient cost-efficiency was estimated with the implicit assumption that the TPP program 
broke even financially during the first 30 months of production. If, in fact, the capitated providers in the 
BHOs' network had experienced positive or negative financial earnings over capitation revenues, the actual 
outpatient cost-efficiency could be over- or under-estimated 
Table 14: Changes in Unit Costs 
·~ L,;1 Cost TDMHMR 30-month TPP 30-month Average Change 
Average 
$196 $16 ,l..92% '$PMPM 
$PUPM $658 $477 ,l..28% 
$per diem (average) $262 $275 ts% 
$per diem (marginal) $312 $530 t70% 
i $per unit of service (average) $64 $77 t20% 
i 
! $per unit of service ( marginal) $52 <O ,I.. 
i 
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4.2 Policy Relevance and Implications 
Without a doubt, Tennessee's experience in public mental health care reform is of great significance 
in public mental health care policy making for its magnitude and its broad focus in managed care reform. 
Unlike most other states, Tennessee boldly rolled out the reform program overnight to cover the entire 
TennCare population, SPMI/SED and non-SPMI/SED alike, TDMHMR consumer or not. There was 
concern that a newly started managed care program would not be capable of handling the entire SPMI/SED 
population at once. There was also concern that SPMI/SED consumers would be worse off under the 
capitation program because of the potential for service reductions. Based on demonstrated outcomes of 
quality of care with respect to the high-risk population, Tennessee's experiment has proven that large-scale 
managed care reform in the public mental health arena can be achieved with minimal, if any, reduction in the 
quality of care for the most vulnerable population. 
Still, the transition from a traditional FFS system to a capitation-based managed care system was 
not painless. This is largely because the "design of the new managed care system reflects the distribution of 
power in a policy community where advocates seeking to protect Medicaid beneficiaries, as well as safety-
net providers seeking to protect their patient base, have exerted considerable influence. Throughout the 
process of Medicaid reform, the economic expectations and practices associated with managed care and 
market competition collided with the political accommodations necessary to make such a transition (Oliver, 
1998 [62], p. 61)" As could be expected, the reform process, and the TPP program which resulted, could 
not satisfy all parties. Not everyone and every interest group was convinced and pleased with the reform 
effort. Six months into the program, the closeout of Spectra Community Mental Health Center in Memphis 
sent the TPP program into its first crisis. In December 1996, over disputes on payment issues, Spectra 
CMHC closed its doors to public mental health care forcing the TPP program to face not only the threat of 
an unstable provider network and an incomplete claims and payment system, but also the challenge of 
ensuring continuity of care for these affected enrollees. Early in 1998 the TPP program had experienced its 
second crisis triggered by skyrocketing pharmacy spending leading to the state decision in taking over 
behavioral pharmacy management and payment responsibility. To date, some serious problems, particularly 
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with provider networks and reimbursement processes, still need to be worked out for the TPP program. 
However, the program is continuing to make inroads in the reform. 
Could the TDMHMR or a FFS system also achieve the goal of cost containment with managed 
care principles? Instead of adopting a carve-out managed care approach, some states have experimented in 
transforming FFS programs into capitation or capitation-like programs. The objectives are to reduce 
transitional shock to consumers, and greater protection to safe-net providers, mostly community mental 
health agencies (CMHAs). Colorado, for example, was one of the states that had parallel experiments 
between a CMHA-run capitation program and a BHO-run program. Based on early findings, the CMHA-
run capitation program was not able to generate a PMPM saving while the BHO-run capitation program did. 
In Tennessee's case, the state had also made a substantial effort to improve the FFS system since the 
beginning of the 1990s. This was culminated in the development and implementation of the Mental Health 
Master Plan in 1992, four years before managed care reform. With the Master Plan in place, the FFS system 
was able to reduce outpatient services with relative frequency, although the total volume of services did not 
come dovm simply because more users were added to the system. Obviously, volume of services directly 
mattered to the CMHAs' revenue base. With the volume of services maintained, so was the CMHAs' 
revenues base. Further, in the inpatient sector, two of the five AAtHis were not closed, as the Master Plan 
had suggested 59, nor were the volume of inpatient bed-days and average length of stay reduced. 
Over the TDMHMR period, the inpatient days and inpatient costs were kept at about 30,000 days, 
19 days per hospital stay, and $8 million expenditure each month. With mounting pressure for cost 
containment and the frustration of being unable to cut costs under the FFS mental health care system, a 
carve-out capitation system was called upon to replace the FFS mental health system completely. This 
followed the reform of Tennessee's Medicaid program. The resulting managed mental health program did 
secure decisive cost savings immediately. Evidently, Tennessee's case further confirms the observation made 
by Strum of the UCLA/RAND Research Center in a carve-out managed mental health care study: ... even 
,., The Master Plan proposed to close down two of the fi\'e state institutes by 19%. 
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unmanaged fee-for-service plans experienced a trend away from inpatient care, but a switch to managed care 
substantially accelerated this trend (Strum, 1997 [8]). 
As was seen through 30 months of the TPP period, the capitation system achieved the goal of cost 
containment through significant reduction in relative service intensity (length of stay, number of services per 
patient per month). To FFS proponents, the challenge is finding economic and management systems that will 
govern behavior of FFS providers if they do not produce efficiently. To managed care advocates, the 
challenge is to demonstrate continuous efficiency and effectiveness. Once excessive services are eliminated 
from the system, outpatient and inpatient service intensities will approach thresholds eventually under certain 
service modalities. Therefore, from a long-term perspective, additional efficiency gain will rely largely on 
seeking productivity improvement, economies of scale, optimal resource and sen,ice modality 
reconfiguration, or substitution. Nevertheless, in Tennessee's experiment, immediate utilization reduction 
was the critical driver for the achievement of short-tenn cost containment. 
In theory, increasing market competition could be an effective policy instrument that would further 
reinforce or improve Tennessee's cost containment effort. In the TPP period, the market competition did 
exist but has not played a significant role in Tennessee's managed care refonn. BHOs in the TPP program 
faced direct and indirect market competitions. First, the managed care program was indirectly challenged by 
the FFS system unlike in most other states where managed care programs were often put side-by-side with 
FFS programs for direct comparisons. This challenge was considered as indirect because the TPP program 
operated under predetermined capitation payments. These payments were derived based on 'shadow prices' 
(Feldstein, I 999 [ l l ])60 or FFS equivalents in fiscal year 1995-96, so that the budget neutral clause specified 
in the federal waiver would hold. Thus, the reform program was forced to produce a budget neutral result as 
if it were a FFS program in order to stay viable. Further, the managed care program needed to demonstrate 
savings in order to be differentiated from the FFS program. 
The second source of competition that the managed care program faced was internal market 
competition among managed care plans. Soon after inception of the program, managed care plans were 
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consolidated to just two major behavioral health plans--Premier and TBH. Competition between the plans 
was not direct because contracts, capitation rates, market share and adverse selection issues were mostly 
under regulation and arbitration by the state. However, with the existence of other competitors, players of a 
newly started managed care program had to moderate their goal of higher revenue or profit earnings 
somewhat. To starting BHOs, the initial objective might not be profit earnings but to get in and stay in the 
game. The issue was, would managed care plans change their tactics once they secured positions as major 
carriers of a public mental health care program? In August 1998 the landscape of Tennessee's managed 
public mental health care evolved into a one-player market with the acquisition ofTBH's parent company by 
Premier's parent company Magellan. With monopoly power in hand, whether the potential of long-term cost 
savings of the reformed public mental health program can be jeopardized is an issue dependent largely on 
how well state legislators can keep BHO monopoly power in check, perhaps by introducing sufficient 
competition or by effective regulation and contract negotiation. 
In contributing to Tennessee's public mental health care reform, the TDMHMR system paved 
necessary ground indeed for Tennessee's overnight mental health care transition. Redistribution and 
optimization between inpatient and outpatient care expenditures and services were under way long before 
the reform. Outpatient expenditure began to outweigh inpatient expenditure in 1993. Perhaps the most 
significant contribution of the TDMHMR administration was the development of the Master Plan, a valuable 
document that clearly identified the key mental health services and laid out the baseline benchmarks of many 
services, such as case management, crisis interventions, and medication management. Unfortunately, the 
TDMHMR program was not able to capitalize on the Master Plan to stay viable because of the nature of the 
FFS system. 
Besides the concern whether managed care has the ability to control cost in the long run, many 
raised concerns whether care outcomes would suffer under managed care. As suggested by this research and 
much other research, managed care programs have the ability to maintain quality. ln fact, it would be in the 
best interest of managed care companies to promote better treatment and care outcomes, short-run and 
"° ll1e .. shado\\· prices" here has the similar connolalion us was described by Paul J Feldstein: ··When IIMOs began lo <!Iller the group 
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long-run. In addition to the internal monetary incentive for promoting effectiveness of managed care, a 
better outcome in quality of care will also help the managed care company in gaining a competitive edge 
when facing stiff market competition (Dorwart and Epstein, 1995 [ 10)).61 In a competitive health care 
marketplace, a health plan must manage costs while contributing satisfaction and effectiveness of care. Poor 
quality service undermines a health plan's ability to compete. Further, ineffective or inferior services and 
treatments also leads to low satisfaction and a waste of resources. In theory, when there is sufficient market 
competition and financial disincentive to poor service performance, pursuing high quality and effective care 
should become an internal and natural process in a managed care system. Therefore, further promotion of 
market competition should improve the TPP program's cost-efficiency. 
4.3 Further Discussion and Research Limitations 
Considering that consumer satisfaction is positively correlated to the level of quality of care 
consumers received. several related consumer satisfaction surveys are reviewed here to provide additional 
evaluation on the TPP program. A consumer satisfaction survey conducted at the end of the first year of the 
TPP program did not find significant dissatisfaction from the TPP recipients (TD!\1HMR, 1997 [ I 9]). 
Seventy percent of overall respondents felt they were somewhat or much better off as a result of their 
services. Only 24 percent of respondents reported they felt about the same as a result of services they 
received. Six percent felt worse. Another consumer satisfaction survey was conducted by one of the BHOs 
in the second year of the TPP operation (TPP/Premier, 1998 [20)). The survey reported that 72 percent of 
the SPMI consumers surveyed agreed they were improving as a result of the services they received; 84 
percent of SPMI consumers surveyed were satisfied with their case managers. Overall for the SPMI 
consumers surveyed, 61 percent were satisfied with their BHO. As for the non-SPMI consumers surveyed, 
67 percent were satisfied with the quality of care and services they received. One recent survey conducted by 
health insurance market in the early to mid-I 980s, they set their premiums jLL~I below the premiums charged by traditional insurers. "Ibis 
practice was referred to a~ · shadow pricing·. " 
01 Dom mt and Epstein: Now, fc1krul qualification for an HMO ha\'c come to represent a minimum standard. Federal status as a pn>xy 
for quality assurance is o!l,:n sought by I !MOs as a marketing adrnntage to reassure prospt,-cli\'e memhcrs they will rccei\'e an appro,·cd 
le,·cl of care. Companies ncgotialmg health care for their employees h.a\'e usually rcqmrcd federal qualilicol!on from an HM() the\' 
planned to offer. 
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the University of Tennessee at Knoxville on the TennCare program, did not find significant dissatisfaction 
from TennCare recipients surveyed (TennCare, 1999 [2 l]) The survey reported that TennCare recipients 
were continuing to manifest increased satisfaction with TennCare since its inception. The survey indicated 
that, consistent with other indicators, the TennCare population adjusted to the move to managed care and 
the provider community improved care provided under TennCare. 
Within some exceptions, most of the findings presented in this research demonstrate the similarity 
to other studies comparing capitation and FFS outcomes reviewed in section 1.4. Typical findings included 
an overall reduction in program expenditures or growth rates; increased access to care; reduction in user 
costs; and reduction in inpatient utilization and costs. This research found unusual increases in inpatient 
admissions and inpatient users along with a significant reduction in inpatient utilization under the TPP 
system which were not seen from other studies. Also not seen from other studies are empirical discussions 
about quantified correlation between program expenditures and traditional production output (bed-days and 
services) under a capiation system. As seen in this study, a newly started capitation program may 
demonstrate a negative, consequently inefficient, correlation between program expenditures and traditional 
production output in the short-run In the long-run, a capitation program should also be able to demonstrate 
cost-efficiencies, even in traditional output measures given sufficient market competition. 
Although the overall economic implication of managed care reform in Tennessee was positive, the 
transition process was not painless. Particularly with the dramatic change to the public mental health care 
structure, interests between safe-net providers (CHMAs and RMHls) and newly empowered managed care 
organizations (BHOs) collided. Anxieties associated with the redistribution of revenue, market share, and 
political power accelerated when the BHOs failed to distribute or reimburse payments (or costs) promptly. 
With the closeout of the Spectra Community Mental Health Centers in Memphis six months after the 
managed care program began, pressure mounted further. The TPP program had to deal with not only 
provider network uprising, but also had to work to assure continuity of care and consumer satisfaction for 
those affected consumers. 
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Besides the realization that this study did not address administrative-related performance issues, 
this study was not able to include cost and utilization performance of the pharmacy sector as well due to lack 
of comparable pharmacy information from the TDMHMR period. Given the facts that pharmaceutical 
expenditures sky-rocketed during the TPP period and BHOs were released from responsibility for covering 
behavioral drugs during the study period, the potential for cost shifting or redistribution between the mental 
health service sectors (inpatient and outpatient) and the pharmaceutical sector was likely to skew the cost 
containment effort. For one thing, as medication treatment becomes more effective after the 1990s than 
before, service substitution between drug therapy and other types of services traditionally provided in an 
outpatient or inpatient routine could become substantial. Therefore, if the magnitude of these substitutions 
and associated costs are not appropriately estimated, and if the payment responsibilities of services are under 
different entities, cost shifting is likely to skew a cost containment effort oriented to just inpatient and 
outpatient sectors. 
The dramatic increase in pharmaceutical costs in Tennessee's public mental health program is not 
unique. Managed care programs in the nation are experiencing steeply rising drug costs starting from the 
late 1990s (Kleinke, 2000 [65)). "Rising pharmaceutical costs now account for the largest portion of health 
cost increases, in part because of slowed increases elsewhere in the industry. Disease management efforts, 
for example, have brought offsetting savings in hospital and physician costs. New treatment options and 
long-term prevention strategies have offset costs in other areas. Advances in molecular biology and 
information technology will bring more rapid development of important new drugs, so the pharmaceutical 
sector will continue to be an important source of cost increases in the future ( Ginsburg, I 998 [ 66 ], p. 168 ). " 
Some view that the cost shifting or increment to the pharmaceutical sector is a predicament of managed 
care. "In the short run, the typical disease management program conspires to induce prescriptions and 
increase pharmacy costs [66)." The question is, to what extent the redistribution of costs from psychiatric 
service sectors to behavioral pharmaceutical sectors can be considered as medically appropriate and 
economically efficient. Such an issue would be less complicated when a managed care company is, at least to 
some degree, financially responsible for medical and pharmaceutical costs. Namely, the company would bear 
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some economic incentive in considering optimization in allocating costs between the psychiatric services and 
phannaceutical utilization. In the TPP's case, separation of financial responsibility for pharmaceutical care 
and behavioral health care of the BHOs would not be the solution to optimizing overall program efficiency 
===•=== 
Overall, this research demonstrated that at the macro level, overall economic implications of 
Tennessee's managed care reform were positive: program spending abated, access to care and quality of 
care improved. At the micro level, the research shows that the managed care program was lacking in cost-
efficiency when traditional health care output were measured at the program level (inpatient bed-days and 
number of outpatient services). Such a finding suggests that future cost containment potential for the 
managed care program should be focused on improving the program's productivity in inpatient and 
outpatient care. This research cautioned on over- and under-estimations due to unknown provider profits, 
potential service substitution, and cost shifting impacts between the mental health care service sectors 
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